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I. INTRODUCTION 
The suitability doctrine prohibits a securities broker-dealer from 
recommending a security to a customer unless she has a reasonable 
belief that the security is suitable for that customer.1 It imposes a 
 
 1. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, NASD Rule 2310, NASD MANUAL (CCH) 4261 
(2000) [hereinafter NASD Rule 2310]; NORMAN S. POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND 
REGULATION § 3.03, at 3-77 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW]. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission has taken the position that the suitability doctrine applies 
not only to the choice of securities but also to the pattern of trading that a broker recommends 
to a customer. For example, purchasing securities with borrowed funds (i.e., margin trading) 
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duty on the broker-dealer to take the financial situation, risk thresh-
old, investment sophistication, investment objectives, and other se-
curities holdings of her customers into account when she recom-
mends a security to them.2 The suitability doctrine was originally 
formulated more than sixty years ago as an ethical standard by the 
National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”), a self-
regulatory organization (“SRO”) of the securities industry to which 
almost all brokers and dealers are required to belong.3 A broker-
dealer who recommended an unsuitable security could be disciplined 
by the NASD,4 but she would not be subject to legal sanctions.5 
Over the years, however, the suitability doctrine has undergone 
“a subtle shift from ethics to law.”6 As long ago as 1978, the Second 
Circuit held in Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc.,7 that a broker’s 
unsuitable recommendation to a customer violated Rule 10b-5, the 
SEC’s general and most important antifraud rule.8 Furthermore, a 
 
rather than for cash, or day trading over the Internet, may be unsuitable for a customer be-
cause of the risks involved in these activities. See In re Application of Rangen, Admin. Proc. 
File No. 3-8994, 1997 SEC LEXIS 762, at *9 (Apr. 8, 1997). 
 2. See Robert H. Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The 
Suitability Doctrine, 1965 DUKE L.J. 445, 449. 
 3. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires every registered broker-dealer to be a 
member of a registered national securities association unless its only transactions are on a stock 
exchange of which it is a member. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b9-1 
(2001). The NASD is the only registered national securities association and has about 5,500 
member firms. SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, SECURITIES INDUSTRY FACTBOOK 31 (2000). The NASD 
adopted the suitability rule in 1939, shortly after the NASD was established as a national secu-
rities association. See Robert N. Rapp, Rethinking Risky Investments for That Little Old Lady: 
A Realistic Role for Modern Portfolio Theory in Assessing Suitability Obligations of Stockbro-
kers, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 189, 197 (1998). 
 4. In two early cases the SEC affirmed NASD disciplinary actions against members for 
violating the suitability rule. See In re Philips & Co., 37 S.E.C. 66 (1956); In re Greenberg, 
40 S.E.C. 133 (1960). 
 5. As discussed in more detail below, the overwhelming majority of the courts that 
have considered the question have refused to imply a private right of action on the basis of a 
violation of an SRO rule. 
 6. LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 900 
(3d ed. 1995). 
 7. 583 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 8. Rule 10b-5 provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange, 
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
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broker’s unsuitable recommendation may be actionable under state 
law.9 Although the law differs from state to state in how it character-
izes the relationship between a broker and a customer, the prevailing 
view is that where the customer places her trust and confidence in 
the broker, the broker owes the customer a fiduciary duty and that 
an unsuitable recommendation may be a breach of this duty.10 
Until the 1980s, the suitability doctrine was applied almost ex-
clusively to recommendations made to individual investors. Perhaps 
the clearest example of a suitability violation occurs where a broker 
recommends speculative securities to a customer whose financial 
situation clearly calls for conservative investments. For example, an 
elderly widow or retired person who needs the income from her in-
vestments for her living expenses and who has no reasonable 
expectation of being able to replace any substantial trading losses 
might also be unaware of the risks of the recommended investment 
because she lacks the background or education to understand 
investments or the securities markets. The investment might also be 
inconsistent with her investment objective. For example, the widow 
or retiree might want conservative investments, in order to preserve 
her principal and receive an assured income, rather than speculation 
or short-term trading.11 Thus, the recommendation of speculative 
securities might be unsuitable for the investor if she is unable to bear 
the risks of the investment, if she is unable to understand these risks, 
or if the investment is inconsistent with her investment objectives.12  
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would op-
erate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale 
of any security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001). The SEC adopted Rule 10b-5 in 1942, pursuant to its author-
ity under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act to adopt rules prohibiting, “in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance.” 15 
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). 
In view of the breadth and scope of the rule, which prohibits fraud by any person in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security, the courts have interpreted the rule to 
prohibit misconduct by broker-dealers as well as various other types of deceitful conduct, in-
cluding misleading corporate publicity and trading on inside information. 
 9. See Rupert v. Clayton Brokerage Co., 737 P.2d 1106 (Colo. 1987). 
 10. See generally POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW, supra note 1, § 2.02. 
 11. See, e.g., In re Guevara, Exchange Act Release No. 34-42793, 2000 WL 679607, at 
*5 (May 18, 2000). In evaluating a security, however, financial managers today often look to 
its total return to shareholders, including price appreciation, rather than only to the dividends 
paid. See VICTOR BRUDNEY & WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
CORPORATE FINANCE 544–70 (4th ed. 1993). 
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investment is inconsistent with her investment objectives.12 
In recent years, however, a number of lawsuits and arbitrations 
have been brought to recover losses suffered not by individual inves-
tors but by institutions, including states and municipalities, publicly 
and privately owned companies, and educational and religious or-
ganizations. In several well-publicized cases, large government enti-
ties, including Orange County, California,13 and the State of West 
Virginia,14 and large publicly owned corporations, such as Procter & 
Gamble15 and Gibson Greeting Cards,16 have attempted to recover 
substantial losses incurred as a result of making risky investments. 
Losses have also been incurred by many smaller institutions, includ-
ing churches, credit unions, colleges, and school districts. In some of 
these cases, the institution has claimed that the investments recom-
mended to it by a broker-dealer were unsuitable for the institution in 
light of its investment objectives as reflected in the governing law, its 
charter, or its written investment policy. In other cases, institutions 
claimed that their investment officers were misled by broker-dealers 
as to the nature and risk of the recommended investments. 
In some of these institutional unsuitability cases, the institutions 
and their financial officers were the unsuspecting victims of overly 
enthusiastic brokers who misrepresented the nature and risk of the 
securities they were selling.17 In others, the institutions’ financial of-
 
 12. Portfolio theory indicates that one should look at the risk of the entire mix of securi-
ties in a portfolio, rather than the risk of each security separately. Thus, even a conservative 
portfolio might include some speculative securities. See Stuart D. Root, Suitability—the So-
phisticated Investor—and Modern Portfolio Management, 1991 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 287, 
347–48; Janet E. Kerr, Suitability Standards: A New Look at Economic Theory and Current 
SEC Disclosure Policy, 16 PAC. L.J. 805, 819–22 (1985). 
 13. In 1995, Orange County filed a complaint against Merrill Lynch claiming that the 
brokerage firm had breached its fiduciary duty to the Country and had committed a securities 
fraud by recommending securities that were not authorized for purchase by state law, not suit-
able for the investment of public monies, and inconsistent with the County’s principal invest-
ment objective of preservation of capital. Complaint of County of Orange, In re County of 
Orange, 191 B.R. 1005 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996). In 1998, Merrill Lynch settled the lawsuit 
for $400 million. Andrew Pollack & Leslie Wayne, Ending Suit, Merrill Lynch to Pay Califor-
nia County $400 million, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1998, at A1. 
 14. See State v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 459 S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1995). 
 15. See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio 
1996). 
 16. See In re BT Sec. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 35,136, 1994 SEC LEXIS 4041 
(Dec. 22, 1994). 
 17. See, e.g., In re Schulte, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-9051, 1997 WL 173668 (S.E.C. 
Apr. 10, 1997). 
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ficers purchased the securities even though they were aware of their 
unsuitability for their institutional employers; thus, the officers were 
themselves guilty of misconduct.18 The willingness (or even eager-
ness) of an institution’s financial officer to act on a broker’s recom-
mendation to buy an unsuitable high-yield (and high-risk) security 
may also be partly or wholly the result of perceived pressure from the 
financial officer’s superiors or governing board to take risks in order 
to obtain higher returns on the institution’s investments in times of 
tight budgets and low interest rates.19 
Given the centrality of the suitability doctrine to the nature of 
the relationship between a broker and his customer, it is not surpris-
ing that a substantial body of writing exists on the subject; further-
more, the suitability cases involving institutional customers that arose 
during the 1980s and 1990s provided additional stimulus to law re-
view writers.20 The justification for writing yet another article on the 
subject is that it is necessary to reexamine the assumptions that are 
routinely made by judges and legal writers: that institutional inves-
tors are sophisticated and that, whether sophisticated or not, they do 
not need the protections afforded by suitability rules. Whether insti-
 
 18. In the Orange County case, Merrill Lynch argued that Robert L. Citron, the 
County Treasurer, made all the investment decisions and was aware of the risks. Citron was 
criminally prosecuted and received a one-year jail term for misappropriation of funds. Pollack 
& Wayne, supra note 13. 
 19. See Derivatives Use by State and Local Governments: Testimony Before the House 
Comm. on Banking, Fin. and Urban Affairs (Oct. 5, 1994) (statement of Alan McDougle, Di-
rector of Finance & Purchasing, Lima, Ohio) [hereinafter Testimony of Alan McDougle]. 
 20. See Seth C. Anderson & Donald Arthur Winslow, Defining Suitability, 81 KY. L.J. 
105 (1992–93); Willa E. Gibson, Investors, Look Before You Leap: The Suitability Doctrine is 
Not Suitable for OTC Derivatives Dealers, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 527 (1998); Kerr, supra note 
12; Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral 
Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627 (1996); 
Jerry W. Markham, Protecting the Institutional Investor—Jungle Predator or Shorn Lamb?, 12 
YALE J. ON REG. 345 (1995); Mundheim, supra note 2; Norman S. Poser, Civil Liability for 
Unsuitable Recommendations, 19 REV. SEC. & COMM. REG. 67 (1986); Rapp, supra note 3, 
at 190 n.3; Lyle Roberts, Suitability Claims Under Rule 10b-5: Are Public Entities Sophisti-
cated Enough to Use Derivatives?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 801 (1996); Root, supra note 12; Jen-
nifer A. Frederick, Note, Not Just for Widows & Orphans Anymore: The Inadequacy of the 
Current Suitability Rules for the Derivatives Market, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 97 (1995); Geof-
frey B. Goldman, Note, Crafting a Suitability Requirement for the Sale of Over-the-Counter 
Derivatives: Should Regulators “Punish the Wall Street Hounds of Greed”?, 95 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1112 (1995); Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Suitability Standards for Sophisti-
cated Investors, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 19, 1998, at 5; Roberta S. Karmel, The Suitability Doctrine, 
N.Y.L.J., June 15, 1995, at 3; Gregory J. Wallance & Andrew S. Carron, Suitability Disputes 
and the Institutional Investor, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 9, 1997, at 1. 
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tutional investors should be able to use the suitability doctrine to re-
cover investment losses from their broker-dealers poses complex 
questions of policy and law. Most courts, arbitrators, and legal com-
mentators have been unsympathetic to these institutional investors 
with suitability claims. The reluctance to award damages to these 
claimants seems to be based, at least in part, on a reluctance to apply 
a doctrine that is essentially paternalistic in its nature to a broker’s 
dealings with its institutional (and wealthy individual) customers.21 
Critics of the doctrine as so applied reason as follows: first, invest-
ment officers of institutions tend to be sophisticated professionals;  
second, even if an institution hires an unsophisticated investment of-
ficer or fails to supervise him properly, that is the institution’s own 
fault. The first prong of the argument tends to support establishing a 
rebuttable presumption of institutional sophistication, while the sec-
ond prong tends to support a conclusive presumption of sophistica-
tion. According to the reasoning of these critics, the institutional in-
vestor, not the broker-dealer who knowingly or recklessly 
recommends an unsuitable security to the investor, should bear the 
responsibility for the recommendation if it goes bad. 
It is my purpose in this article to examine the above premises 
from both a factual and normative point of view. While many institu-
tional investment officers are highly experienced and capable, many 
others lack the ability or training to understand the nature and risks 
of the complex investments that many securities firms sell to their 
customers. Many institutional investors, including small ones and 
those whose principal purpose is not investment, should not be 
faulted for their failure to hire sophisticated investment officers, be-
cause it is not cost-effective to employ persons with the training to 
understand arcane investment vehicles. 
Furthermore, the system of compensation in general use on Wall 
Street, under which broker-dealers and their salespersons receive very 
large commissions if they are successful in their sales pitches, gives 
them a strong incentive to oversell. Even a sophisticated investment 
officer may not be able to resist selling pressure from a highly moti-
vated and well-trained salesperson. It has long been held that sophis-
ticated as well as unsophisticated investors are entitled to protection 
 
 21. See Markham, supra note 20, at 369 (arguing that the suitability rule is “a very pa-
ternalistic approach to customer protection”). 
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from fraudulent conduct by securities salespeople22 and that such 
conduct is actionable under Rule 10b-5 only if it is made with sci-
enter, i.e., intentionally or recklessly.23 
Following a brief discussion of the key role played by institu-
tional investors in today’s securities markets, Part II discusses the ap-
plicability of the suitability doctrine to institutional investors. Part II 
raises two principal questions. First, to what extent can the invest-
ment officers of institutions be considered sophisticated? Second, 
should the courts adopt a presumption (either rebuttable or conclu-
sive) of institutional sophistication? Because a conclusive presump-
tion of sophistication is, in effect, a legal rule, it would protect bro-
ker-dealers from liability for unsuitable recommendations made to 
unsophisticated as well as sophisticated institutional investors. 
Part III will examine the three principal regulatory and legal 
categories on which the suitability doctrine is based—self-regulatory 
rules, federal securities fraud, and common-law breach of fiduciary 
duty—and the difficulties faced by institutional plaintiffs in bringing 
an action to recover losses suffered as a result of unsuitable recom-
mendations. My conclusion is that the goals of the federal securities 
laws—protection of investors and the markets—as well as traditional 
principles of agency law, require that a broker-dealer be held to ac-
count in damages for unsuitable recommendations that are made 
recklessly or with knowledge of their unsuitability, whether the cus-
tomer is an individual or an institutional investor. 
It is important to note, however, that most claims brought 
against broker-dealers by their customers, including their institu-
tional customers, are heard by arbitration panels, not by courts, be-
cause broker-dealers generally insist that their customers sign pre-
dispute arbitration agreements when they open their accounts.24 No 
distinction will be made in this article between lawsuits and arbitra-
tions, since arbitrators are required to apply the same substantive law 
 
 22. Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969). 
 23. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (holding that scienter is a 
necessary element of a violation of Rule 10b-5). 
 24. In 1987 the Supreme Court held that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate claims 
brought under the 1934 Act were enforceable. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 
U.S. 220 (1987). Following McMahon, arbitration largely replaced litigation as the method of 
resolving disputes between customers and their brokers. Norman S. Poser, When ADR Eclipses 
Litigation: The Brave New World of Securities Arbitration, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1095, 1101 
(1993). 
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that a court would.25 Nonetheless, there is a notable difference in 
that arbitration panels typically do not write opinions explaining 
their decisions, and these decisions have no value as precedent.26 Fur-
thermore, the scope of judicial review of arbitral awards is extremely 
narrow.27 It therefore is often impossible to ascertain either the basis 
for an arbitral award or whether the award reflects the current state 
of the law.28 
II. THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR AND  
INVESTMENT SOPHISTICATION 
A. Institutional Investment in the Securities Markets 
1. The extent of institutional investment 
Perhaps the most important and influential development in the 
securities markets during the past half-century has been the growth 
of institutional investment, in both relative and absolute terms. The 
percentage of all corporate stock owned by American institutions 
(principally pension funds and mutual funds) increased from seven 
percent of the total in 1950 to fifty-one percent in 2000.29 In abso-
 
 25. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989) 
(“By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights af-
forded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, 
forum.”) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
628 (1985)). 
 26. See Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential 
Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 
44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1226 (1993) (“under the prevailing judicial view, . . . the only law 
that results [from an arbitral award] is the award itself, and that law is binding only on the im-
mediate parties.”). 
 27. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994), a court may not vacate an 
arbitrator’s award simply because the arbitrator made erroneous findings of fact or misinter-
preted the law, see Miller v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 884 F.2d 128, 130 (4th Cir. 1989), 
but only if the arbitrator acted in manifest disregard of the law, see Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, 
Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1286 (1999). 
 28. See Norman S. Poser, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards: Manifest Disregard of 
the Law, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 471 (1998); see also Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, 
Suitability in Securities Transactions, 54 BUS. LAW. 1557, 1593 (1999) (asserting that tribu-
nals have a great deal of flexibility in deciding cases initiated by customers against brokers for 
unsuitable transactions). 
 29. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BOOK FOR THE YEAR 2000 61 (2001) [herein-
after NYSE FACT BOOK 2000]. 
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lute terms, institutions’ assets increased more than a hundred-fold 
during this period, from $143 billion to over $19 trillion.30 Institu-
tional investors have also outdistanced individuals as the principal 
type of participant in the securities markets.31 It has been estimated 
that institutional investors account for about seventy percent of trad-
ing volume on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), which is by 
far the nation’s largest market for equity securities.32 
2. Regulatory implications of institutional investment 
The growth of institutional investment has important regulatory 
implications. In view of the presumed greater ability of institutional 
investors to fend for themselves, it may be argued that the regulatory 
burden placed on persons selling securities to institutional investors 
should be lightened.33 On the other hand, because individual inves-
 
 30. Id. 
 31. The growth of institutional investment is the result of a variety of social, political, 
and economic forces, including more liberal retirement benefits to employees, favorable tax 
treatment of retirement funds, and the propensity of individuals to invest indirectly in the mar-
ket through mutual funds rather than directly. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES 
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 27–28 (2d ed. 1997). 
 32. See JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND 
INVESTMENT TERMS 282 (5th ed. 1998). In the year 2000, the total market capitalization of 
stocks listed on the NYSE was $12.4 trillion, compared to $3.6 trillion for Nasdaq, the second 
largest equity market. SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, SECURITIES INDUSTRY FACT BOOK 48 (2001) 
[hereinafter SECURITIES INDUSTRY FACT BOOK]. 
Between 1960 and 2000 the average daily volume of trading on the NYSE increased 
from 3 million shares to 1.04 billion shares. NYSE FACT BOOK 2000, supra note 29, at 100. A 
good indication of the dominance of the market by institutional investors is the percentage of 
trading volume that is in block transactions (i.e., transactions of more than 10,000 shares), 
because relatively few individuals have the resources to trade in such large amounts. In 1965, 
16.2 percent of reported share volume on the NYSE consisted of block transactions. NEW 
YORK STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BOOK FOR THE YEAR 1998, at 93 (1999) [hereinafter NYSE 
FACT BOOK 1998]. By 1979 this figure had risen to 26.5 percent, and by 2000, block transac-
tions accounted for 51.7 percent of reported volume. In absolute terms, block transactions 
increased more than sixty-fold in the past twenty-one years—from 2.2 trillion shares in 1979 to 
135.7 trillion shares in 2000. Assuming that most block transactions are made by institutional 
customers, this percentage increase demonstrates the importance of institutions in the securi-
ties markets. Id. at 93. 
The dominance of the NYSE in the securities industry is demonstrated by the fact that 
in 2000 the 271 member firms of the NYSE that did business with the public, although com-
prising less than four percent of all broker-dealer firms, accounted for seventy percent of all 
revenues and eighty-two percent of all assets of the securities industry. SECURITIES INDUSTRY 
FACT BOOK, supra note 32, at 28. 
 33. See Saul Cohen, The Death of Securities Regulation, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 1991, at 
A10. 
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tors now tend to participate in the market indirectly through mutual 
funds, pension funds, and other institutions rather than by opening 
up their own individual brokerage accounts, it can be argued that the 
SEC and other securities regulators should direct their regulatory ef-
forts to broker-dealers’ selling practices with respect to institutional 
investors. As institutions have become a major source of commission 
revenue for brokerage firms, they share with individual investors the 
dubious honor of being targets of predatory and abusive brokers. It 
is, therefore, hardly surprising that sales of securities to institutional 
investors have presented suitability problems. 
3. Institutional investors: Size and purposes 
There is no single definition of the term “institution,” “institu-
tional investor,” or “institutional customer.”34 The NASD defines 
“institutional customer” as “any entity other than a natural per-
son.”35 The term thus includes mutual funds and closed-end funds; 
private and public pension funds; life and casualty insurance compa-
nies; bank-managed personal trusts; corporate profit-sharing plans; 
state and local governments; savings institutions; commercial banks; 
credit unions; and various kinds of nonprofit organizations, such as 
churches and other religious organizations, college endowment 
funds, foundations, and the like.36 
Institutional investors vary widely in size. While the largest insti-
 
 34. A leading financial dictionary defines “institutional investor” simply as an “organiza-
tion that trades large volumes of securities.” DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 32, at 282. 
 35. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, NASD Rule 2310-3, NASD MANUAL (CCH) 4265 
(2000) [hereinafter NASD Rule 2310-3]. 
 36. At the end of 2000, institutions held $10.0 trillion in U.S. equities (i.e., shares of 
corporate stock), or 58.9% of the total, while households held the remainder. Of these hold-
ings, mutual funds held $3.2 trillion (19.1%); private pension funds held $2.0 trillion (11.8%); 
public pension funds held $1.4 trillion (7.9%); foreign institutions held $1.7 trillion (10.1%); 
life insurance companies held $943 billion (5.5%); bank personal trusts held $315 billion 
(1.9%); other insurance companies held $188 billion (1.1%); state and local governments held 
$115 billion (0.7%); and closed-end funds held $36 billion (0.2%). SECURITIES INDUSTRY 
FACT BOOK, supra note 32, at 70–71. 
If all financial assets are taken into account, the sheer size of institutional holdings is 
even more impressive. Just to list the largest categories of institution, at the end of 1999, com-
mercial banks held $6.0 trillion in financial assets; private pension funds held $5.0 trillion; mu-
tual funds held $4.5 trillion; life insurance companies held $3.1 trillion; and state and local 
government employee retirement funds held $3.0 trillion. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. 
RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: FLOWS AND 
OUTSTANDINGS, FOURTH QUARTER 1999, at 69–77 (2000). 
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tutions own or manage vast amounts of money, there are many 
smaller institutional investors whose holdings of securities and other 
investment instruments are relatively modest. Some idea of the vari-
ety of institutional investors in terms of their size and characteristics 
may be gained by looking at the lawsuits and arbitrations in which 
suitability issues have been raised. The plaintiffs in these disputes in-
clude the State of West Virginia;37 Orange County, California;38 the 
City of San Jose, California;39 several towns and villages;40 local gov-
ernmental authorities;41 public educational institutions;42 public and 
corporate pension funds;43 union pension funds;44 commercial 
banks;45 savings and loan institutions;46 religious organizations;47 
publicly held companies;48 and family trusts.49 A review of these cases 
shows that the investment assets of the institutions that have initiated 
claims against broker-dealers raising suitability issues ranged from $2 
million (in the case of a corporate pension plan)50 to $7.4 billion (in 
 
 37. See State v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 459 S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1995). 
 38. See In re County of Orange, 191 B.R. 1005 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996). 
 39. See City of San Jose v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc., No. C 84-20601 
RFP, 1991 WL 352485 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 1991). 
 40. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Poder, 712 F. Supp. 680 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
 41. See Memphis Hous. Auth. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc., 639 F. Supp. 
108 (W.D. Tenn. 1986). 
 42. See Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508 v. Westcap Gov’t Sec., Inc., No. 94 C 1920, 1994 
WL 530849 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 1994). 
 43. See Minneapolis Employees Ret. Fund v. Allison-Williams Co., 519 N.W.2d 176 
(Minn. 1994); Vill. of Arlington Heights, 712 F. Supp. 680; Duffy v. Cavalier, 259 Cal. Rptr. 
162, 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), review granted, 778 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1989), review denied, 264 
Cal. Rptr. 740 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). 
 44. See Pension Fund-Mid Jersey Trucking Indus.-Local 701 v. Omni Funding Group, 
731 F. Supp. 161 (D.N.J. 1990). 
 45. See Associated Randall Bank v. Griffin, Kubik, Stephens & Thompson, Inc., 3 F.3d 
208 (7th Cir. 1993); Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017 (4th Cir. 
1997). 
 46. See MidAmerica Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 886 F.2d 
1249 (10th Cir. 1989). 
 47. See Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 
800 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1986); Westchester Jewish Ctr. v. Gruntal & Co., 1994 NYSE Arb. 
Dec. LEXIS 615 (July 6, 1995) (Filson, Gray, Guggenheimer, Arbs.). 
 48. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio 
1996); In re Gibson Greetings, 159 F.R.D. 499 (S.D. Ohio 1994); In re BT Sec. Corp., Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-35136, 1994 SEC LEXIS 4041 (Dec. 22, 1994). 
 49. See Boettcher & Co. v. Munson, 854 P.2d 199 (Colo. 1993). 
 50. See Duffy v. Cavalier, 259 Cal. Rptr. 162, 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), review 
granted, 778 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1989), review denied, 264 Cal. Rptr. 740 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). 
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the case of Orange County, California).51 Obviously, the size of an 
institution affects its financial ability to hire investment officers with 
the training and professional skills necessary to understand the com-
plex types of financial instruments marketed by the securities indus-
try today. 
Institutional investors differ not only in their size but also in 
their underlying purposes. The principal or sole purpose of some 
types of institutions, most notably mutual funds and pension funds, 
is to invest money on behalf of their shareholders or beneficiaries. 
The growth of these institutions into multi-billion-dollar giants re-
flects the trend of individuals to invest their savings in the market in-
directly rather than directly, thus enabling even investors with little 
capital to invest to gain the twin advantages of professional manage-
ment of their money and diversification of their investments. Such 
investment-oriented institutions, particularly if they are large, can be 
expected to employ trained and experienced professionals to handle 
their investments, professionals who will bring their own independ-
ent judgment to bear on brokers’ recommendations. For many types 
of institutions, however, investment of their funds is only a secon-
dary or incidental purpose. These include such entities as municipali-
ties, educational organizations, business corporations, churches, and 
other nonprofit organizations. These institutions may not under-
stand the need for, and may not be able to afford, a professional staff 
that is trained to keep abreast of and evaluate all the new types of 
“financial engineering” that brokerage firms may urge upon them. 
The nature and purposes of an institution will also determine the 
time frame of its investments. Depending on its stated investment 
objectives, a mutual fund or large pension fund, which invests the 
funds it manages for the needs of its shareholders or beneficiaries, 
may have a large proportion of its assets allocated to long-term in-
vestments, such as stocks and bonds. On the other hand, the normal 
investment activities of a municipality, thrift company, or educa-
tional, religious, or other nonprofit organization, whose liquid assets 
consist largely of idle funds that will be needed periodically for the 
operations of the organization, will be different. Such institutions 
typically buy low-risk or risk-free short-term instruments from a bank 
 
 51. See In re County of Orange, 191 B.R. 1005 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996); PHILIPPE 
JORION, BIG BETS GONE BAD: DERIVATIVES AND BANKRUPTCY IN ORANGE COUNTY 21 
(1995). 
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or brokerage house and roll them over every few months, a proce-
dure that does not require a great deal of time or financial sophistica-
tion.52 
For an institution whose principal purpose is not investment, the 
responsibility for handling its investments typically is given to the in-
stitution’s treasurer or chief financial officer, who may have several 
other important functions that take up most of his time, and who 
may possess little knowledge or understanding of the securities mar-
kets or complex financial instruments such as derivatives.53 Such a 
person’s understanding of the market or of particular investment in-
struments may be inadequate to enable him to exercise independent 
judgment concerning the advisability of investing in novel or com-
plex instruments, especially in the face of a determined and skillful 
selling effort by a broker. Furthermore, it may not be economically 
feasible for the institution to hire full-time professional money man-
agers to handle its investments. It may also not seem necessary to the 
institution to retain outside professional advice, even if that is afford-
able, if the broker-dealer represents itself to the institution as an in-
vestment adviser working for the institution, upon whom the institu-
tion can safely rely, rather than as a commercial venture whose 
paramount goal is to maximize its sales. 
B. The Investment Sophistication of Institutional  
Investment Officers 
1. Why sophistication is important 
The investor’s sophistication is a key concept in relation to claims 
based on unsuitable recommendations. If the claim is brought under 
Rule 10b-5, which prohibits fraud in connection with the purchase 
or sale of a security, sophistication is relevant to the question of 
 
 52. Some educational and religious organizations, however, also have permanent en-
dowments, which may be invested in stocks and bonds. 
 53. For example, Philip Luhmann, the treasurer of the City Colleges of Chicago, was 
responsible for all of City Colleges’ banking relationships; for preparing its budget; for receiv-
ing, maintaining custody of, and disbursing cash; and for setting up procedures that dealt with 
the institution’s cash management. He could, therefore, devote only a limited amount of his 
time to his investment responsibilities. Transcript of testimony of Philip R. Luhmann at 3–4, 
In re Westcap Enter., Case No. 96-43191-H2-11 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 1997) [hereinaf-
ter Westcap I], rev’d on other grounds, 230 F.3d 717 (5th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Westcap 
II]. 
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whether misleading statements or omissions made by the broker-
dealer were material54 and whether the investor justifiably relied on 
the misstatements or omissions.55 Materiality and justifiable reliance 
are both requisite elements in a private suit brought under Rule 10b-
5.56 In a suitability claim brought under Rule 10b-5, control of the 
account by the broker may also be a necessary element of the claim.57 
The investor’s sophistication is relevant to the question of whether 
the investor or the broker controlled the account.58 
If an institutional investor’s claim is that the broker-dealer, by 
recommending unsuitable securities, breached a fiduciary duty to the 
investor, the sophistication of the institution’s investment officers 
may be relevant to the issue of whether the broker owed fiduciary 
duties to the institution, a question which in many jurisdictions de-
pends on whether the investment officers placed their trust and con-
fidence in the broker-dealer.59 
 
 54. See Lehman Brothers Commercial Corp. v. Minmetals Int’l Non-Ferrous Metals 
Trading Co., No. 94 Civ. 8301 JFK, 2000 WL 1702039 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2000). 
 55. See Davis v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 906 F.2d 1206, 1217 
(8th Cir. 1990); Michael Slonim, Customer Sophistication and a Plaintiff’s Duty of Due Dili-
gence: A Proposed Framework for Churning Actions in Nondiscretionary Accounts Under 
SEC Rule 10b-5, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 1101, 1106–07 (1986) (“[T]he inquiry into customer 
sophistication is really an equivalent of the Rule 10b-5 requirement that the customer exercise 
good judgment and due care in order to recover damages. This requirement is termed due 
diligence.”). 
For a comprehensive discussion of the cases requiring that the plaintiff justifiably rely on 
the defendant’s misstatements or omissions in order to state a cause of action under Rule 10b-
5, see WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING § 4.1 n.11 (1996 & 
Supp. 2001). The justifiable reliance requirement is sometimes described as a requirement that 
the plaintiff exercise due diligence. Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 172–80. 
 56. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 57. See O’Connor v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 965 F.2d 893, 898 (10th Cir. 1992). 
 58. See Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 59. Lehman Bros., 2000 WL 1702039, at *26 (quoting Scott v. Dime Sav. Bank, 886 
F. Supp. 1073, 1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 101 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1996)) (applying New 
York law); see also MidAmerica Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 886 
F.2d 1249 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying Oklahoma law); Connor v. First of Mich. Corp., Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 95,350 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (applying Michigan law); Police Ret. Sys. of 
St. Louis v. Midwest Inv. Advisory Servs., Inc., 706 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Mo. 1989), aff’d, 940 
F.2d 351 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying Missouri law). For a discussion of the circumstances under 
which a broker-dealer is considered to be a fiduciary of its customer, see POSER, BROKER-
DEALER LAW, supra note 1, § 2.02. 
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2. Sophistication and complex investments 
An investor usually is regarded as sophisticated if she has suffi-
cient understanding and intelligence to be able to evaluate a broker’s 
recommendations and to exercise independent judgment as to those 
recommendations.60 Strictly speaking, an institutional investor, not 
being a natural person, cannot have (or, for that matter, lack) sophis-
tication. The degree of sophistication of an institutional investor is 
necessarily the sophistication of the individual or individuals to 
whom the institution gives the responsibility of investing its money. 
Some courts have been unwilling to impose liability on broker-
dealers who recommend unsuitable securities to institutional cus-
tomers, because they assume the investment officers of institutions to 
be sophisticated. Investor sophistication, however, has meaning only 
in relation to the instruments that are being sold. During recent 
years, a plethora of novel and highly complex securities have come to 
the market. Many of these are called derivatives, because their value 
is derived from the performance of an underlying financial asset, in-
dex, or other investment.61 Some derivatives, such as options on a 
stock or a well-known index (e.g., the Standard & Poor’s 500 Indus-
trial Index), have standardized terms and are traded on stock ex-
changes.62 Others are custom-made derivative instruments (not all of 
which, however, fall within the definition of a security). Many of 
these “over-the-counter” derivatives, including complex options, 
swaps, and collateralized mortgage obligations (“CMOs”), have 
been sold to institutions.63 Some of these instruments are contracts 
 
 60. See Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc. v. Adams, 718 P.2d 508, 516 (Colo. 
1986). 
 61. DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 32, at 147. For a description of derivatives and 
their uses, see Frank Partnoy, Adding Derivatives to the Corporate Law Mix, 34 GA. L. REV. 
599 (2000). For a practicing lawyer’s view that regulation of derivatives is often counterpro-
ductive, see Saul S. Cohen, The Challenge of Derivatives, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1993 (1995). 
 62. For a description of the exchange-listed options market, see Norman S. Poser, Op-
tions Account Fraud: Securities Churning in a New Context, 39 BUS. LAW. 571, 586–92 
(1984). 
 63. For descriptions of a complex custom-made swap and an option that were sold by a 
broker-dealer to a large corporation, see In re BT Sec. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 
35,136, 1994 SEC LEXIS 4041, at *10–*13 (Dec. 22, 1994). 
In 1994, a municipal financial officer testified before Congress concerning the variety 
and complexity of derivatives: 
Collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs), zero-coupon instruments such as 
STRIPS, stripped into interest-onlys (IOs) and principal-onlys (POs), forwards, fu-
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that are custom-made by broker-dealer firms for the purpose of sell-
ing them to their institutional customers. 
While a derivative may be purchased for the purpose of hedging 
and is a useful tool for limiting risk, derivatives can themselves be 
highly risky, and, owing to their complexity, the risk is not always 
readily apparent to the person who assumes it.64 The investment offi-
cer of an institution who has no difficulty understanding the limited 
risk involved in purchasing certain traditional institutional invest-
ments, such as short-term Treasury bills and high-grade commercial 
paper, may lack the necessary experience or training to evaluate a 
complex derivative instrument and may, therefore, place his trust in 
the judgment and honesty of the broker to select the institution’s in-
vestments.65 In some instances, this trust has been misplaced.66 
In a rapidly changing financial world driven by increasing compe-
tition, new technology, and new investment instruments, any gener-
alizations about investors’ sophistication must be viewed with suspi-
cion. According to one commentator, “[I]nvestor sophistication, as 
that term is generally used, may in fact be a myth. Certainly it is a 
concept that has to carry far too much weight in light of the search 
by fiduciaries for help in understanding the complexities of modern 
investment opportunities, strategies and markets.”67 It is clear that 
the officers of many small institutions who are responsible for han-
dling their investments lack investment sophistication. Sometimes 
these persons perform several other functions and have neither the 
time nor the training to keep up with developments in modern  
finance, including the creation of complex investment instruments 
 
tures, currency and interest rate swaps, options, floaters/inverse floaters, floaters 
hedged with swaps, indexed/fixed-rate bonds, cap, floors and collars, as well as ex-
otic fixed-rate programs known as RIBS/SAVRS, PARS/INFLOS, and Bull/Bear 
floaters—this myriad of esoteric and intricate products is enough to confound even 
the most experienced finance professional, whether public or private. 
Testimony of Alan McDougle, supra note 19. 
 64. One definition of a derivative is a “transferable high-risk security such as a future or 
an option.” JOHN CLARK, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF BANKING AND FINANCE 111 
(1999). 
 65. See Root, supra note 12, at 337 (“Our financial world is one in which investment 
opportunities are evolving swiftly; institutional management is unable realistically to keep up 
with changes produced by the so-called ‘rocket scientists’; and, regulatory authorities them-
selves are often ill-equipped to assess the impact of investment choices produced from a vast 
array of new creations.”). 
 66. See, e.g., In re BT Sec. Corp., 1994 SEC LEXIS 4041. 
 67. Root, supra note 12, at 355. 
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that are designed to allocate and transfer risk.68 
3. Lack of sophistication of some institutional investment officers 
A relatively recent SEC administrative action illustrates the lack 
of sophistication of some of the smaller institutions. Between 1990 
and 1994 a securities salesman named Kenneth J. Schulte and several 
other salespersons, working out of a room in Houston, Texas, sold 
over $39.4 million worth of risky derivative securities to at least thir-
teen municipalities and school districts in Ohio. The Ohio investors 
lost more than $8.2 million.69 An SEC administrative law judge 
(“ALJ”) found that the financial officers of these institutional inves-
tors were unsophisticated and did not understand derivatives. They 
had informed Schulte that they had conservative investment policies 
and maintained essentially risk-free portfolios. Nevertheless, Schulte, 
by means of aggressive and intimidating sales tactics, was able to sell 
highly speculative securities to these institutions. By persistent phone 
calls, he pressured the financial officers to buy the derivatives. The 
investors relied on Schulte’s representations that the derivatives were 
risk-free investments guaranteed by the United States government or 
a government agency. The ALJ found that Schulte knew that these 
statements were false and that he persuaded the investors to purchase 
the securities regardless of whether they were consistent with their 
investment objectives. He did not provide the investors with written 
materials describing the securities, nor did he disclose or discuss with 
them the substantial risks involved in the investments.70 
Schulte preyed primarily upon the unsophisticated financial offi-
cers of small institutions.71 However, the representatives of larger in-
 
 68. See Transcript of Testimony of Richard C. McCoy, vol. 29 at 5179–80, City of San 
Jose v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc., No. C. 84-20601 RFP, 1991 WL 352485 
(N.D. Cal. June 6, 1991). 
 69. In re Schulte, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-9051, 1997 WL 173668, at *2–*3 (S.E.C. 
Apr. 10, 1997). 
 70. Id. at *3–*4. The SEC barred Schulte from the securities industry. He was also con-
victed in federal court of wire fraud, mail fraud, and securities fraud and was sentenced to fifty-
one months imprisonment. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Sixth Circuit. 
United States v. Schulte, No. 97-3511, 1999 Fed. App. 110U, 1999 WL 331655 (6th Cir. 
1999). The SEC also brought a civil action against him in federal court in Ohio, which led to 
an injunction against him and an order to disgorge $400,000 in commissions that he obtained 
through fraudulent means. Schulte, 1997 WL 173668, at *4. 
 71. The response of the Securities Industry Association, the trade association of the se-
curities industry, to this kind of situation is that the institutions, not the securities dealers, are 
at fault: 
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stitutions, whether or not they can be considered sophisticated, may 
be unable to counter a broker-dealer’s efforts to mislead them. For 
example, BT Securities, the broker-dealer affiliate of Bankers Trust, 
was found by the SEC to have intentionally allowed Gibson Greet-
ings, Inc., a publicly owned corporation, to believe that the risk of 
certain interest-rate swaps was substantially less than it actually was.72 
Even professional managers can be influenced by recommenda-
tions of broker-dealers. Economists have noted the “herd behavior” 
of professional institutional investors. These money managers are 
known to mimic each other in allocating their funds’ assets. A money 
manager who follows the herd in making an investment decision will 
avoid damage to his reputation if the decision turns out to be wrong. 
A study of the factors that determined institutional investors’ deci-
sions to purchase a particular stock showed that: 
Purchase of stocks that had recently had large price run-ups tended 
to be motivated by the advice of others (other investment profes-
sionals, newsletters, etc.). . . . This suggests that the comfort inher-
 
Investment officers who commit a municipality to a financial obligation that they do 
not understand merit neither sympathy nor a remedy when losses result. Municipali-
ties can retain professional advisors to assist investment officers in evaluating transac-
tions and strategies they do not fully understand. On the other hand, dealers who 
have not been engaged as financial advisors and who do not have access to the type 
of information necessary to evaluate the appropriateness of a transaction should not 
be held responsible for such a determination. 
Testimony Before House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., Subcomm. on Capital Markets, 
Sec. and Gov’t Sponsored Enters., 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Marc E. Lackritz, Presi-
dent of the Sec. Indus. Ass’n). 
To be sure, the suggestion that an institution that does not have its own sophisticated 
investment officers can retain professional advisors has merit. However, owing to the officer’s 
lack of sophistication and the broker’s reassurance, an investment officer may have believed 
that he understood the investments and therefore did not see a need to turn to others for ad-
vice. 
 72. BT Securities’ internal taping system recorded a conversation in which a managing 
director of the brokerage firm discussed the “differential” between the actual value of Gibson’s 
positions and the valuation that BT Securities provided to Gibson: 
I think we should use this [downward market price movement] as an opportunity. 
We should just call [the Gibson contact], and maybe chip away at the differential a 
little more. I mean we told him $8.1 million when the real number was 14. So now 
if the real number is 16, we’ll tell him that it is 11. You know, just slowly chip away 
at that differential between what it really is and what we’re telling him. 
In re BT Sec. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 35,136, 1994 SEC LEXIS 4041, at *7 (Dec. 
22, 1994); see also In re Smith Barney, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-39118, 1997 WL 
583732 (Sept. 23, 1997) (SEC settled administrative action against broker-dealer for allegedly 
making false disclosures to municipal customer concerning swaps).  
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ent in following common wisdom can lead professional money 
managers to invest in stocks where fundamentals might dictate oth-
erwise.73 
Even a sophisticated investment officer may be easy prey for a 
skillful and highly motivated securities salesman. As Professor 
Langevoort has pointed out, a broker may subtly manipulate an 
institutional investor’s professional ego: 
Take, for example, a well-prepared broker who pitches an exotic, 
customized interest rate swap to a corporate treasurer. Even if the 
treasurer has a fair degree of financial sophistication, it is unlikely 
that her knowledge or understanding extends to such a unique 
product. Under these circumstances, many potential buyers will re-
sist displaying their ignorance.74 
An illustration of a relatively large institutional investor suffering 
substantial losses as a result of unsuitable recommendations is the 
experience of the City of San Jose (the “City”). A lack of institu-
tional sophistication (and perhaps an excess of institutional vanity) 
was a contributing factor to the market losses suffered by the City. 
During the early 1980s, the City engaged in short-term trading (in-
cluding many purchases and sales in large volume on the same day) 
of 30-year Treasury bonds. Although the credit risk of long-term 
Treasury bonds is virtually nil, there is a substantial market risk unless 
the holder plans to hold the bonds until their maturity, because the 
market price of long-term bonds is extremely sensitive to fluctuations 
in interest rates.75 The City lost about $60 million in 1984, when 
interest rates rose and the market value of the bonds plummeted.76 
 
 73. David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 AM. 
ECON. REV. 465, 477 (1990). 
 74. Donald C. Langevoort, supra note 20, at 657. 
 75. As the maturity of a bond increases, any difference between the current rate of inter-
est and the yield of the bond will have a greater effect on the price of the bond. Long-term 
bonds, therefore, have more price volatility than short-term bonds. See SIDNEY HOMER & 
MARTIN L. LEIBOWITZ, INSIDE THE YIELD BOOK: NEW TOOLS FOR BOND MARKET 
STRATEGY 44–53 (1972). 
 76. City of San Jose v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc., No. C. 84-20601 RFP, 
1991 WL 352485 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 1991). The City had been able to engage in trading on a 
large scale through the use of a form of financing known as reverse repurchase agreements, 
pursuant to which the City resold the securities that it purchased to the brokerage firm, agree-
ing to repurchase them at a higher price. The difference between the resale and repurchase 
prices represented the cost of the financing. See MARCIA STIGUM, THE REPO AND REVERSE 
MARKETS 25–27 (1989). 
2POS.DOC 3/5/02  9:06 PM 
1493] Liability for Unsuitable Recommendations 
 1513 
The City sued several brokerage firms and banks in federal court for 
securities fraud, claiming that they had recommended securities and 
a pattern of investment that were unsuitable for a municipality 
investing public funds.77 After a six-month trial, a federal jury 
awarded the City a verdict of $18 million in damages against two 
brokerage firms, although several jurors afterwards criticized City 
officials for their failure to monitor investments and for failing to 
alert the City to danger.78 
Testimony given at the trial revealed that the officials who man-
aged the City’s investments had little investment experience and an 
inadequate understanding of the risks of the kind of trading in which 
the City was engaged. Richard McCoy, the City’s treasurer, had a 
Master’s degree in Business Administration but only limited experi-
ence with investments.79 Moreover, because McCoy had numerous 
other duties to perform as treasurer, he largely relied on the assistant 
treasurer, Arthur Matthiesen, to handle the City’s investments. A 
long-term employee of the City, Matthiesen had only a high school 
education and no training in investments.80 Nor had he ever read a 
book on investments.81 It is difficult to believe that the brokers and 
bank employees who dealt with Matthiesen were not cynically taking 
advantage of his naiveté and sense of his own importance.82 
 
 77. The City also claimed that the defendants had breached their fiduciary duty to it 
under the common law. The judge dismissed this claim on the ground that the City did not 
have a fiduciary relationship with the defendants. The jury also rejected a claim of churning the 
City’s account. 
 78. City of San Jose, 1991 WL 352485; see also Shearson, Paine Webber Found Guilty, 
L.A. TIMES, June 22, 1990, at D2. Ten other bank and brokerage-firm defendants had mean-
while settled with the City for a total of $12 million. The jury also imposed damages of 
$500,000 on the City’s outside auditing firm. The verdict also included $8.4 million in inter-
est. Maline Hazle, San Jose Bond Suit Victory—City Wins $26 Million in Verdict, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS, June 21, 1990, at 1A. The two brokerage firms against which the verdict 
had been entered moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but the case was settled 
before the motion could be decided. See City of San Jose, 1991 WL 352485. 
 79. Transcript of testimony of Richard C. McCoy, vol. 29 at 5179–80, City of San Jose, 
1991 WL 352485. 
 80. Transcript of testimony of Arthur Robert Matthiesen, vols. 8-1374, 8-1402, 8-
1404, City of San Jose, 1991 WL 352485. Before becoming assistant treasurer, Matthiesen 
had worked for the City of San Jose, among other things, as a license inspector, collector of 
sewer charges, orderer of supplies, and as a designer of forms. Id. at 8-1382, 8-1390. 
 81. Id. at 8-1404. Matthiesen testified at the trial that he had never heard of anything 
called a fundamental or a technical approach to investing. Id. at 8-1437, 8-1440. 
 82. See also Westcap I, Case No. 96-43191-H2-11 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 1997). 
In Westcap II, a bankruptcy court found that Luhmann, the treasurer of the City Colleges of 
Chicago, was not fully aware of the high-risk nature of certain collateralized mortgage obliga-
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C. Should There Be a Presumption That Investment Officers  
of Institutions Are Sophisticated? 
Although not all investment officers are sophisticated in the sense 
that they are able to understand the nature and risks of complex de-
rivative securities, several writers have suggested that there should be 
a presumption that institutions are sophisticated investors.83 Such a 
presumption would have the advantage of being a clear rule, which 
might have the effect of reducing the amount of litigation in this 
area. It also might induce some institutional investors to retain the 
services of professional investment advisers. While this author knows 
of no court that has explicitly adopted the suggestion that institu-
tional investors are presumptively sophisticated, the courts have gen-
erally been ready to find sophistication without giving adequate 
weight to the complexity of the recommended securities or the im-
pact of the skills of a salesperson on an investment officer who is re-
luctant to admit that he doesn’t fully understand the securities or 
their risks.84 
1. Rebuttable and conclusive presumptions 
There are two different kinds of presumptions—rebuttable and 
 
tions that were sold to the City Colleges by two enterprising brokers. On review, however, the 
Fifth Circuit reversed this finding and absolved the brokerage firm of liability under the Texas 
Securities Law, in part because “Luhmann gave every indication to [the brokers] of being a 
sophisticated investor.” 230 F.3d 717, 731 n.27 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 83. See C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities 
Laws, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1153 (proposing a conclusive presumption that all institutions 
are sophisticated); Markham, supra note 20, at 376 (asserting that any institution that is quali-
fied as an “accredited investor” under Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933 should be 
presumed sophisticated); Roberts, supra note 20, at 804 (arguing that any public entity should 
be conclusively presumed sophisticated based on its institutional capacity); see also Ass’n of the 
Bar of N.Y., Report of the Committee on Securities Regulation, 53 THE RECORD 62, 96 
(1998) [hereinafter Bar of N.Y.] (stating that all institutional investors should be presumed to 
be “sophisticated enough to evaluate risk, seek outside financial advice or refrain from invest-
ing in complex instruments. Any other rule [would] effectively [convert] dealers into guaran-
tors of investments.”). 
 84. See, e.g., Westcap II, 230 F.3d 717 (finding that the Treasurer of the City Colleges 
of Chicago gave the appearance of sophistication to the two brokers who sold securities to the 
institution because he had previously traded in the same derivatives that were the subject of the 
dispute and because he had the use of a split-screen Bloomberg system to track the market); 
Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 499, 512–17 (D. Md. 1997) 
aff’d., 132 F.3d 1017 (4th Cir. 1997) (refusing to adopt a presumption that an institution is 
sophisticated as a matter of law but finding that there was no material dispute as to the sophis-
tication of the plaintiff bank’s employees). 
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conclusive.85 If there were a rebuttable presumption that an institu-
tional investor (or, alternatively, an institutional investor of a given 
size) is sophisticated, the fact of sophistication would be assumed, 
once the fact is established that the party in question is an institu-
tion. The institution could then rebut the presumption by introduc-
ing evidence of non-sophistication. A conclusive presumption, on 
the other hand, establishes one fact (i.e., the investor is sophisti-
cated) upon proof of another fact (i.e., the plaintiff is an institution). 
A conclusive presumption is simply a rule of substantive law, which 
makes the established fact irrelevant.86 Thus, a conclusive presump-
tion that institutions (or institutions of a certain size or type) are so-
phisticated would simply be a rule of law that makes the question of 
sophistication irrelevant. 
2. A rebuttable presumption of institutional sophistication? 
Rebuttable and conclusive presumptions are supported by differ-
ent kinds of reasons. The reasons for creating a rebuttable presump-
tion relate to facilitating the conduct of a trial. A rebuttable pre-
sumption may be created in order to avoid occupying the time of the 
court unnecessarily on issues that are unlikely to be litigated, on 
which evidence is lacking, which heavily accord with probability, or 
which are difficult to prove by direct evidence.87 A conclusive pre-
sumption, on the other hand, like any other rule of substantive law, 
is supported by reasons of fairness, certainty, and public policy. 
 
 85. A rebuttable presumption is a rule of evidence that states that where a basic fact has 
been established, another fact will be assumed unless and until evidence has been introduced 
which would support a finding of the nonexistence of such other fact. Mason Ladd, Presump-
tions in Civil Actions, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 277. 
 86. Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions in Civil Actions Reconsidered, 66 IOWA L. REV. 843, 
846 n.16 (1981). 
 87. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1987) (“Presumptions typically 
serve to assist courts in managing circumstances in which direct proof, for one reason or an-
other, is rendered difficult.”). Justice Holmes has commented: “A presumption upon a matter 
of fact, when it is not merely a disguise for some other principle, means that common experi-
ence shows the fact to be so generally true that courts may notice the truth.” Greer v. United 
States, 245 U.S. 559, 561 (1918). 
Professor Ladd cites five reasons for the creation of presumptions: (1) to expedite trials 
on issues not likely to be litigated; (2) to avoid a procedural impasse and an undesirable result 
because of the lack of evidence; (3) to weigh certain factual inferences more heavily because 
they accord with probability; (4) to account for special means of access or peculiar knowledge 
of the facts by one of the parties; and (5) to recognize the social desirability of the legal conse-
quences of a particular presumed fact. Ladd, supra note 85, at 280–81. 
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It is my view that proposals for a rebuttable presumption of insti-
tutional sophistication are not justified; in fact, the courts have not 
adopted these proposals. A person’s degree of sophistication is not a 
characteristic that lends itself to being quantified, particularly since it 
must be measured in relation to the securities that the broker rec-
ommends. The numerous cases that have come up in recent years, 
including the Schulte, City of San Jose, and City Colleges cases dis-
cussed in this article, in which institutions of different types and sizes 
were sold unsuitable securities, suggest that any presumption of insti-
tutional sophistication does not accord with actual experience.88 
The sophistication of an institution’s financial officers—that is, 
their ability to understand complex securities and their risks—cannot 
realistically be assumed. Aside perhaps from some professionally 
managed mutual funds or pension funds,89 the financial officers of 
even large institutions may be unsophisticated in terms of under-
standing the characteristics and risks of complex, recently invented 
securities.90 Furthermore, it does not waste the time of the fact finder 
to hear evidence on the issue of sophistication because that issue may 
be central to determining whether a suitability claim against a bro-
ker-dealer will succeed. Nor is ascertaining the sophistication of an 
institution’s financial officers a more difficult task than that of mak-
ing any other factual determination; in most cases, these individuals 
will be among the principal witnesses examined at the trial or arbitra-
tion hearing. The issue of sophistication may, in fact, be the most 
important issue to be decided by the finder of fact. 
3. A conclusive presumption of institutional sophistication? 
Although institutional size is no guarantee of sophistication, the 
argument has been made that even if the financial personnel of some 
 
 88. In support of his proposal for a conclusive presumption of sophistication for all insti-
tutions, Professor Fletcher quotes a statement by Dean Clark that “[i]nstitutional investors are 
usually sophisticated and powerful enough to demand and get the information they need be-
fore committing their money,” but provides no other basis for this generalization. Fletcher, 
supra note 83, at 1153–54. 
 89. Even mutual funds managers have shown that they may lack sophistication; as a re-
sult, some funds have suffered huge losses from derivatives trading. Markham, supra note 20, 
at 361. 
 90. Although Professor Markham is in not in favor of imposing a suitability requirement 
on brokers dealing with institutional investors, he concedes that “institutional investors have 
established, quite conclusively, that they can seem as naive in their investments in derivative 
instruments as a proverbial widow or orphan.” Id. at 358–59. 
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institutions, particularly large institutions, are not sophisticated, they 
should be treated as if they were. Some commentators have, there-
fore, proposed that there be a conclusive presumption of institutional 
sophistication, regardless of whether the institution’s financial offi-
cers are actually sophisticated, on the ground that such a rule would 
force institutions to hire competent, sophisticated investment man-
agers.91 A conclusive presumption would, as a practical matter, fore-
close institutional investors from making suitability claims in most 
cases.92 In fact, one legal writer cuts right through the “presump-
tion” language and simply proposes that institutions not be permit-
ted to bring suitability claims.93 As that writer put it, the courts 
should not “pierce the veil” of the prima facie sophistication of the 
institution to get at the sophistication of the individual decision 
makers.94 Another version of the conclusive presumption (or rule) 
proposal would apply only to institutions whose assets under man-
agement exceed a certain amount.95 
If all institutional investors were conclusively presumed to be so-
phisticated, it would be prudent and even necessary for every institu-
tion covered by the presumption to hire a professional investment 
adviser. The effect of the presumption would be to shift the cost of 
investigating recommended securities from the broker-dealer to the 
customer. The proponents of a conclusive presumption argue, how-
ever, that allowing institutional investors to bring suitability claims 
essentially guarantees them a “win-win” position when they invest in 
 
 91. Fletcher, supra note 83, at 1154 (“Although some institutions may lack sophistica-
tion in investment matters, the law should encourage them to have sophisticated parties invest 
on their behalf.”); Markham, supra note 20, at 376 (“Any [brokerage] firm should be able to 
assume that an institution has the ‘independent’ capability to assess the risk of its invest-
ments.”).  
 92. Of course, if a broker intentionally or recklessly made a material misrepresentation 
to an institutional investor and the investor justifiably relied on the misrepresentation, the bro-
ker would be liable for securities fraud, quite aside from any question of suitability. However, 
as I discuss later in this article, it is likely to be difficult for a sophisticated investor to prove 
that any reliance it placed on a broker’s misstatement was justifiable. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 143–96. 
 93. Roberts, supra note 20, at 804 (stating that courts should not allow public entities 
sustaining losses in derivatives to make suitability claims). 
 94. Id. at 829. 
 95. See Goldman, supra note 20, at 1159 (suggesting that the obligations of broker-
dealers selling derivatives to large institutions be “essentially restricted to disclosure,” while for 
other derivatives users, “a stronger, affirmative suitability requirement should force dealers to 
take some responsibility for ensuring that the customer belongs in the derivatives market and 
that the particular transaction is appropriate.”). 
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unsuitable high-risk securities. If the investments are successful, the 
institution takes the profit; if not, the institution brings a suitability 
claim, using the incompetence or lack of sophistication of its finan-
cial officers to rebut the broker’s defense that the institution was so-
phisticated.96 
D. Institutional Sophistication and Cost Efficiency 
These arguments take too little account of the realities of institu-
tional investment and the securities markets. Many institutions, par-
ticularly small ones, would find it prohibitively expensive to hire ex-
perts familiar with the derivatives markets and the complex array of 
new financial instruments in order to ensure that the institution will 
be able to respond intelligently and capably in the event that a bro-
ker recommends the purchase of a risky investment. Small institu-
tional investors are unlikely to have the financial resources to employ 
investment officers who have the knowledge, training, and experi-
ence to understand the risks involved in new and complex types of 
securities and whether a given investment increases or decreases the 
total risk of an institution’s portfolio. Furthermore, even professional 
managers are not immune from investing an institution’s funds in 
unsuitable securities.97 
Of course it would be desirable for all brokerage-firm customers, 
including individual investors, to be diligent and knowledgeable in 
handling their investments. However, even a large institutional inves-
tor such as Procter & Gamble or the State of West Virginia may find 
it uneconomical to employ an entire department of specialized finan-
cial experts in order to avoid any possibility of suitability problems 
arising. Because many custom-made over-the-counter derivative se-
curities are invented by the firms that sell them, there is likely to be a 
wide disparity of knowledge about these instruments between the 
sellers and even the most financially acute buyers. As one municipal 
financial officer testified before a congressional committee: 
Regardless of the size of their portfolio or their level of sophistica-
tion, state and local government investors are unlikely to have ac-
 
 96. Roberts, supra note 20, at 829. 
 97. See, e.g., In re Mitchell Hutchins Asset Mgmt., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-
39001, 1997 WL 537042 (Sept. 2, 1997) (SEC settled administrative action against broker-
dealer and investment advisory firm for investing in risky derivative securities on behalf of a 
fund, which fund was marketed to the public as a low-volatility investment). 
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cess to either the quantity or quality of information relating to spe-
cific investment instruments that a broker-dealer has. Broker-
dealers have real-time, virtually unlimited access to information, 
such as pricing, structure, and risk factors of an instrument.98 
In general, duties should be placed on the party who can avoid 
the risk of harm at the least cost.99 Here, the question is whether it is 
cheaper and more efficient to place suitability obligations on broker-
dealers and to require them to police their sales personnel effectively, 
on the one hand, or to require institutional investors to hire sophisti-
cated investment officers or retain sophisticated independent invest-
ment advisers, on the other. The answer to the question may be dif-
ferent, depending on whether the institution is, for example, a large 
mutual fund with a multi-billion-dollar portfolio or a college with an 
investment portfolio of $50 million. In general, however, it is likely 
to be more efficient and less costly to place the responsibility of un-
derstanding the risks of these instruments on the persons who manu-
factured them or who are selling them on behalf of their manufac-
turers than on the institutional buyers, who would be put to 
considerable expense in order to assure themselves of a sufficient un-
derstanding of the instruments. As a leading jurist of our time has 
stated: 
[P]recautions are wasteful, and rules of law ought not induce buy-
ers of securities to verify information that the sellers are supposed 
to provide. Securities laws are designed, in large part, to compel the 
person who knows firm-specific information to reveal it, and 
thereby eliminate wasteful duplication of effort in digging out 
facts.100 
 
 98. Testimony Before the House Commerce Comm., Subcomm. on Telecommunica-
tions and Fin., on Behalf of the Gov’t Fin. Officers Ass’n, 104th Cong. 1995 (statement of 
Mark J. Saladino, Principal Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles County, Cal.). 
 99. See Holtz v. J.J.B. Hilliard W.L. Lyons, Inc., 185 F.3d 732, 743 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(finding broker not liable for failing to ensure that customer completed application designating 
the beneficiary of his IRA account because the customer was in a better position than the bro-
ker to ensure that the application accurately reflected the customer’s intentions). Tort law 
theorists have advanced the concept that the party who could avoid an accident at the lowest 
cost—i.e., the cheapest cost-avoider—should bear the legal responsibility for the accident, re-
gardless of fault. See Stephen G. Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability, and the Cheapest Cost-
Avoider, 78 VA. L. REV. 1291 (1992); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
137–42 (2d ed. 1977); GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970). 
 100. Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 1546 
(7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.). 
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Similarly, the “win-win” argument is unrealistic. It strains credu-
lity to believe that an institution’s senior managers would intention-
ally hire “gun-slingers” or incompetents to handle its investments in 
the belief that the institution will be able to recover their losses in 
court or before an arbitration panel if the investments go wrong. 
Sane persons do not make their business plans in that way, if only 
because of the uncertainty of the outcome of the litigation and the 
attorneys’ fees and other tangible and intangible litigation costs. Any 
senior official or director of an institution who took that gamble 
would himself be subject to liability for mismanagement. Nor is it re-
alistic to believe that an institution’s financial officers will cynically 
make risky investments knowing that their employers will be able to 
bring a suitability claim if the investments are unsuccessful. In fact, 
several of the financial officers of institutions that have brought suit-
ability claims lost their jobs as soon as the losses came to light, and 
some were sued or criminally prosecuted.101 
Perhaps most important, if a conclusive presumption of sophisti-
cation were to apply to any entity other than a natural person (in-
cluding such entities as small municipalities, churches and syna-
gogues, school districts, estates, trusts, close corporations, and 
pension plans of close corporations), the practical effect of that pre-
sumption would be to deny the protections of the securities laws and 
the common law to many investors with little or no investment so-
phistication, because they were unable to evaluate or to resist the 
sales pitch of a securities salesman. On the other hand, to adopt a 
presumption of sophistication that is limited to larger institutions ig-
nores the fact that the financial officers of even these entities may not 
actually be sophisticated when it comes to complex securities such as 
derivatives. Certainly, the novelty and complexity of the security 
should be a factor in determining whether an institution’s invest-
ment officer should be considered sophisticated in a particular in-
stance. However, it would be difficult to devise standards that ac-
count for the varied sizes and types of institutions that would be 
excluded from the presumption. 
E. Institutional Investors As Accredited Investors 
Professor Markham has proposed that any institution having the 
 
 101. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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status of “accredited investor” under Regulation D of the Securities 
Act of 1933 (1933 Act)102 be presumed to be sophisticated.103 In 
general, issuers of securities can sell securities to an unlimited num-
ber of accredited investors and still qualify for exemption from regis-
tration under the 1933 Act.104 Furthermore, Regulation D does not 
require issuers to furnish any specific information to accredited inves-
tors,105 and accredited investors need not meet the sophistication re-
quirement of Regulation D.106 Since the term “accredited investor” 
includes a bank, savings and loan institution, insurance company, 
public or private pension plan with assets of over five million dollars, 
small business investment company, tax-exempt organization, or 
trust with assets of over five million dollars,107 Professor Markham’s 
proposal would effectively bar many small institutions from bringing 
suitability claims. He argues that since institutions accept the regula-
tory benefits of “accredited investor” status, they should not be al-
lowed to make after-the-fact claims against brokers that they lacked 
knowledge and sophistication.108 
 
 102. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–.506 (2001). 
 103. As Professor Markham makes clear: “Any [brokerage] firm should be able to assume 
that an institution has the ‘independent’ capability to assess the risk of its investments if that 
institution has the status of an accredited investor under the federal securities laws or is an ex-
empt institution under the Commodity Exchange Act.” Markham, supra note 20, at 376. 
Regulation D exempts an issuer from registering securities under the Securities Act if 
certain conditions are met. Under Rules 505 and 506, which are part of Regulation D, an of-
fering may be made to an unlimited number of accredited investors, but to no more than 
thirty-five non-accredited investors. Furthermore, certain specified information that must be 
furnished to non-accredited investors need not be furnished to accredited investors. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.502(b). 
 104. Under Rules 505 and 506, an issuer may sell to no more than thirty-five non-
accredited investors and to an unlimited number of accredited investors. 
 105. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1). 
 106. Rule 506 requires that each purchaser who is not an accredited investor, or his pur-
chaser representative, have “such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters 
that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment. . . .” 17 
C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii). 
 107. The term “accredited investor” also includes wealthy individuals. 17 C.F.R. § 
230.501(a) (2001). Rule 501 is part of Regulation D under the Securities Act, which removes 
certain regulatory requirements where persons offer or sell securities to accredited investors. 
The Commodity Exchange Act exempts institutional investors, including banks, trust compa-
nies, savings associations, credit unions, governmental entities, and insurance companies from 
the requirement that most commodity options contracts be traded on an exchange. Markham, 
supra note 20, at 355–56; see also section 207 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. 
L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1394 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78c) (defining “qualified 
investor”). 
 108. Markham, supra note 20, at 347. 
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This argument has two flaws. First, the principal purpose and re-
sult of accredited-investor status are not to confer a regulatory bene-
fit on an institution; principally, it benefits the issuer or controlling 
person of an issuer by permitting it to sell securities to institutional 
investors and wealthy individuals without regard to their sophistica-
tion and without making the disclosures that it otherwise would be 
required to make, either in a registration statement or other disclo-
sure document.109 Second, accredited investor status provides an ex-
emption only from the registration requirements of the Securities 
Act; it was never meant to relieve any person from liability for de-
frauding an investor, however sophisticated he may be.110 Professor 
Markham’s proposal goes much further than the SEC has been will-
ing to go: it would exempt a broker-dealer from liability in a private 
suit for intentionally or recklessly recommending unsuitable securi-
ties to any institution that qualifies as an accredited investor. For ex-
ample, a church or school district whose total assets consist princi-
pally of real estate worth $5 million would be conclusively presumed 
to be a sophisticated investor. 
The SEC’s willingness to create a conclusive presumption of so-
phistication for most institutional investors under Regulation D was 
part of the agency’s effort to assist small business capital formation.111 
It was based on the premise that institutional investors and rich indi-
viduals could fend for themselves without the protections afforded 
by registration because they could be expected to have sufficient 
bargaining power in transactions with small issuers to ask for and ob-
tain the information they feel is necessary to their making an in-
formed investment decision.112 These purposes are not relevant in a 
situation where a broker is selling derivatives or other complex secu-
rities to institutional investors in the secondary trading markets. Put-
ting aside the questions of whether the SEC’s presumption of so-
phistication is factually justified and whether the qualifications for 
being an accredited investor are set at the optimum level,113 these 
 
 109. Under Regulation D, specific disclosures are not required to be made to accredited 
investors. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.502(b), 230.506 (2001). 
 110. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2001) (preliminary note 1). 
 111. See Proposed Revision to Certain Exemptions, Release No. 33-6339 (Aug. 18, 
1981). 
 112. Id.; Exemption of Limited Offers & Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6121, 
1979 SEC LEXIS 711, at *8–*9 (Sept. 11, 1979). 
 113. See MARK I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 157–59 (2d ed. 1993) (criticiz-
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transactions with the issuer in the more formal setting of a private 
placement of securities (where the institution may itself be repre-
sented by a brokerage firm) involve a very different level of bargain-
ing power from that enjoyed by an institutional investor in a trading-
market transaction. 
F. Sophisticated Investors Are Entitled to Protection 
The foregoing discussion suggests that not all, and perhaps only 
a small percentage of, institutional investors are sophisticated in any 
meaningful sense, given the training, knowledge, and experience 
needed to evaluate the complex securities and market strategies that 
broker-dealers create and recommend to their customers. Many large 
institutions undoubtedly have sophisticated investment officers, but 
some do not; and many small institutions lack the resources to hire 
sophisticated officers or advisers. Moreover, the Second Circuit has 
held in a landmark case that even sophisticated investors deserve the 
protection of the securities laws, including protection from inten-
tionally or recklessly fraudulent conduct by securities salesment: “[A] 
salesman cannot deliberately ignore that which he has a duty to 
know and recklessly state facts about matters of which he is  
ignorant. . . . The fact that his customers may be sophisticated and 
knowledgeable does not warrant a less stringent standard.”114 
Just as doctors and lawyers are liable for defrauding both their 
sophisticated and unsophisticated patients and clients, brokers should 
likewise not be immunized from liability because their customers are 
sophisticated.115 Professor Langevoort has persuasively shown that 
 
ing Regulation D on the ground that it gives certain investors “far less protection than they 
previously had enjoyed”). 
 114. Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969); see also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sul-
phur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 
394 U.S. 976 (1968) (“The speculators and chartists of Wall Street and Bay Street are also 
‘reasonable’ investors entitled to the same legal protection afforded conservative traders.”). 
 115. In the settlement of an administrative action against a brokerage firm for failing rea-
sonably to supervise a salesmen whose largest and most active customers were institutions, the 
SEC stated: 
[I]t was not appropriate for the firm to structure its supervision of [the salesman] in 
reliance, in part, on the expectation that, because most of [his] sales and trading ac-
tivities were for institutional or other large and presumably sophisticated customers, 
his customers would themselves be more alert to improper sales practices than unso-
phisticated retail customers. 
In re Howe Barnes Inv., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 37-707, 1996 WL 536517, at *4 
(Sept. 23, 1996). 
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brokers, whose income usually depends on a high volume of sales, 
are both motivated and able to manipulate their customers’ egos in 
order to sell securities: 
There are methods . . . to lower both retail and institutional cus-
tomers’ resistance to the sales pitch and create a desire for a par-
ticular investment, all subtly exploiting the moral hazard implicit in 
every principal-agent relationship. None of these requires that the 
compliant customer be unsophisticated (though he or she may be 
acting imprudently). Indeed, . . . the customer’s very possession of 
a degree of financial sophistication is manipulated in certain sales 
techniques. Nor are customers who are effectively manipulated 
likely to realize this manipulation, given their strong need to view 
themselves as reasonable and responsible. 
. . . 
[O]nce a broker successfully cultivates trust, willing reliance by the 
sophisticated investor—imprudent though it may seem in hind-
sight—is quite likely and, for that reason, alone, worthy of some 
protection.116 
Given the huge variety of institutional investors in terms of size, 
nature, and purpose, there is no justification to presume the sophisti-
cation of an institutional financial officer or to impute sophistication 
to the institution itself, either as a matter of fact, law, or public pol-
icy. 
G. Suitability and Broker-Dealers’ Compensation 
A compelling argument can be made that the root of the prob-
lem of unsuitable recommendations (and other abusive selling prac-
tices) is the compensation system in general use in the securities in-
dustry.117 Broker-dealers have a “temptation to oversell [when] 
involved in . . . excessively large commissions.”118 The normal 
method of compensation is the commission, which is based on the 
price of the securities sold, not on the success of the investment. If 
 
 116. Langevoort, supra note 20, at 631. I believe that even a non-reliant plaintiff may be 
entitled to protection under Rule 10b-5. See infra text accompanying notes 177–209. Never-
theless, I agree with much in Professor Langevoort’s article. 
 117. See, e.g., supra note 70 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying note 127. 
 118. See Anderson v. Knox, 297 F.2d 702, 722 (9th Cir. 1961) (commenting on an un-
suitable recommendation by an insurance salesman). 
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securities are not sold, the broker-dealer receives no compensation. 
The broker (i.e., the salesperson who is employed by the broker-
dealer) is in the same position, because his only compensation is a 
percentage—usually between thirty and fifty percent—of the com-
mission or markup received by the broker-dealer.119 As one financial 
writer has stated, under this compensation system, “few brokers are 
immune to the temptation to consider their financial self-interest 
from time to time while they are advising clients. Being at once a 
salesman and a counselor is too much of a burden for most mor-
tals.”120 
Furthermore, brokers are often paid more, and therefore are mo-
tivated to exert more sales pressure, for selling riskier securities or for 
selling the firm’s proprietary securities. Thus, the customer may be 
paying a higher commission for assuming greater risk. While it may 
seem illogical and counterintuitive to charge a customer more to buy 
a less desirable product, the justification that is given for this practice 
is that higher commissions are necessary in order to encourage bro-
kers to sell these investments.121 The commission system gives bro-
kers an incentive not only to trade their customers’ accounts fre-
quently but also to promote speculative securities, which in many 
instances are not suitable for the customer.122 
The motivation to sell risky securities (and not to disclose their 
risk adequately) that the compensation system creates applies to sales 
efforts aimed at institutional as well as individual investors. The sell-
ing-practice problems driven by the securities industry’s compensa-
tion system have thus far resisted efforts for reform.123 Institutional 
finance officers, whether sophisticated or not, are often barraged by 
sales pitches from their self-styled financial counselors, who are in re-
ality highly paid and thus highly motivated salesmen and sales-
women. In addition, in many instances brokerage firms exert eco-
nomic pressure on their sales staffs by imposing quotas to sell more 
 
 119. For a discussion of the commission system, see Report of the Comm. on Compensa-
tion Practices, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,614, at 86,508 (Apr. 10, 
1995) [hereinafter Compensation Practices Report]. 
 120. Albert Haas, Let’s Put Brokers on a Straight Salary, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1977, § 3, 
at 12. 
 121. Ellen E. Schultz, Getting Started: Failing to Consider Commissions Can Be Costly 
Error, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1991, at C1. 
 122. See Robert T. Greene, Comment, Differential Commissions as a Material Fact, 34 
EMORY L.J. 507 (1985). 
 123. See Compensation Practices Report, supra note 119, ¶ 85,614, at 86,508. 
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securities and more securities of particular kinds. If the quotas are 
not met, the broker may forego perks and other compensation or 
may lose his or her job.124 It is unlikely that these production quotas 
are ever disclosed to customers. 
Any detailed discussion or critique of the compensation system 
of the securities business is beyond the scope of this article. None-
theless, in deciding whether institutional investors to whom unsuit-
able securities are sold should be afforded the protection of the secu-
rities laws, the powerful motivation of the broker-dealers and their 
salespersons to exert pressure must be taken into account. Like the 
legendary bank robber Willie Sutton, who allegedly said (or more 
likely didn’t say) that he robbed banks “because that’s where the 
money is,”125 brokers, whose living depends on commission income, 
are naturally drawn to institutional investors. While broker-dealer 
firms may have difficulty preventing their salespersons from recom-
mending unsuitable securities, perhaps the principal reason for this 
difficulty is the incentive to do so provided by the commission sys-
tem. 
The commissions to be earned from transactions with institu-
tions can be enormous. For example, in the Westcap Government 
Securities case, in which the City Colleges of Chicago lost $50 mil-
lion, or half of its entire portfolio, as a result of its purchase of de-
rivatives known as collateralized mortgage obligations, two salesmen 
received commissions of $2.7 million from the sale of derivatives to a 
single institutional customer over a period of a few months.126 Simi-
larly, Schulte, a broker who sold unsuitable derivative securities to 
thirteen small municipalities, received commissions of $400,000 on 
these sales.127 Even a sophisticated financial officer may have diffi-
culty resisting a salesperson who is not only skillful and determined 
 
 124. See Charles Gasparino, Merrill Retreats on Broker Sales Quotas For Its Financial 
Foundations Program, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2000, at C23; see also POSER, BROKER-DEALER 
LAW, supra note 1, § 16.01. 
 125. See WILLIE SUTTON, WHERE THE MONEY WAS (1976). Like many legends, the 
truth of this one is subject to considerable doubt. According to one source, what Sutton actu-
ally said was that he robbed banks because “I enjoyed it. I loved it. I was more alive when I 
was inside a bank, robbing it, than at any other time of my life.” Steve Cocheo, The Bank 
Robber, THE QUOTE, and The Final Irony, at http:/www.banking.com/aba/pro-
file_0397.htm (March 1997). 
 126. Westcap II, 230 F.3d 717, 719 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Westcap I, Case No. 96-
43191-H2-11, ¶ 66 at 18 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 1997). 
 127. In re Schulte, 1997 WL 173668, at *2–*3 (S.E.C. Apr. 10, 1997). 
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but also highly motivated. 
The sale of securities, even to a large institutional investor, is not 
likely to resemble a typical commercial transaction between two 
business entities. It is a truism that securities are not bought; they are 
sold. The agents of brokerage firms who sell securities are above all 
skillful professional salespersons that wage energetic campaigns to 
sell their wares. The institutions targeted by these campaigns are 
typically subjected to persuasive selling arguments and subtle flattery 
by brokers.128 The brokers’ compensation on successful sales efforts 
tends to be enormous by most standards and provides a strong in-
centive for aggressive sales tactics, which the financial officers of the 
institutions may as a practical matter be unable to resist.129 
III. THE REGULATORY AND LEGAL SOURCES OF  
THE SUITABILITY REQUIREMENT 
In view of the advantage that brokerage firms have over their 
customers with respect to access to information and the strong in-
centive to oversell created by the compensation system used in the 
securities industry, unsuitable recommendations are proscribed by 
three types of legal or quasi-legal rules. First, the self-regulatory or-
ganizations in the securities industry, including any national securi-
ties exchange or national securities association, are required by law to 
regulate their members;130 and the rules of the SROs specifically pro-
hibit unsuitable recommendations. Although, according to the ma-
jority view of the courts, a violation of the NASD (or other SRO) 
suitability rule does not give rise to criminal or civil liability,131 such a 
violation can have major consequences for a broker-dealer. The 
NASD has the power to fine and to bar a broker-dealer, or an indi-
vidual who is associated with a broker-dealer, temporarily or perma-
 
 128. See, e.g., Transcript of testimony of Arthur Robert Matthiesen, vol. 9-1441 to 9-
1456, City of San Jose v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc., No. C 84-20601 RFP, 1991 
WL 352485 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 1991). 
 129. The Schulte and Westcap cases provide examples of the substantial compensation 
that securities salesmen have received through the sale of derivatives to institutional investors 
are. See supra note 70 and text accompanying notes 126–27. 
 130. The 1934 Act provides that a national securities exchange or a national securities 
association shall not be registered unless its rules “are designed to prevent fraudulent and ma-
nipulative acts and practices [and] to promote just and equitable principles of trade.” Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6 (b)(5), 78f(b)(5), 15A(b)(6), 78o-3(b)(6). 
 131. See cases cited in POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW, supra note 1, § 2.06[A], at 2-107 
to 2-111. 
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nently from the securities industry.132 
Second, the antifraud rules of the federal securities laws, particu-
larly SEC Rule 10b-5, have been interpreted to prohibit unsuitable 
recommendations if intentionally or recklessly made and to subject 
the broker-dealer to liability in an enforcement action by the SEC133 
as well as in a private lawsuit.134 
Finally, under the common law of agency, a broker who makes 
such a recommendation may be liable for breach of his fiduciary duty 
to his customer.135 Each of these sources of liability will now be con-
sidered. 
A. Self-Regulatory Rules 
1. The NASD suitability rule 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934136 (the “1934 Act” or 
“Act”) contemplates that much of the regulation of broker-dealers 
will be conducted by self-regulatory organizations, particularly na-
tional securities exchanges and national securities organizations. In 
fact, the Act does not give the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) general authority to adopt rules governing a broker-dealer’s 
conduct in its dealings with its customers,137 but largely leaves it to 
 
 132. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, NASD Rule 8310(a), NASD MANUAL (CCH) 7271 
(2000). 
 133. See In re Guevara, Exchange Act Release No. 34-42793, 2000 WL 679607 (May 
18, 2000). 
 134. See Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 135. See MidAmerica Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 886 F.2d 
1249 (10th Cir. 1989). 
 136. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2000). 
 137. The 1934 Act gives the SEC authority to regulate several specific activities of bro-
ker-dealers, including margin lending, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1994), financial responsibility, 15 
U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3) (1994), and floor trading, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(a) (1994). The only way the 
SEC can regulate the conduct of broker-dealers in relation to their customers, however, is 
through the SROs and through the antifraud provisions of the Act. The SEC has followed 
both routes in its regulation of brokers’ unsuitable recommendations. 
The proposed Federal Securities Code, developed by the American Law Institute during 
the 1970s under the direction of Professor Louis Loss, would have given the SEC authority to 
adopt rules to define, and to prescribe means to prevent, unfair dealings by a broker with its 
customers. The proposed provision was designed “to carve out a degree of misconduct that is 
more than ‘unethical,’ so that it is within the proper sphere of direct regulation rather than 
self-regulation, but less than ‘fraudulent.’” AM. LAW INST., FED. SEC. CODE, PROPOSED 
OFFICIAL DRAFT § 915 & n.1 (1978). The Code, however, was never enacted. 
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the SROs to develop and enforce standards in this regulatory area.138 
Under the Act, national securities associations are required to be 
registered with the SEC, and almost all broker-dealers are required 
to be members of a national securities association. The only national 
securities association ever to be registered with the SEC is the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers. The 1934 Act requires the 
NASD to establish and enforce rules “to promote just and equitable 
principles of trade” in the securities industry.139 Pursuant to its statu-
tory mandate, the NASD adopted its suitability rule not long after 
the NASD was established in 1939.140 The rule, which is now desig-
nated as Rule 2310, states in part: 
 (a) In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or ex-
change of any security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for 
believing that the recommendation is suitable for such customer 
upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to 
his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and 
needs.141 
The NASD’s suitability rule is one of the principal components 
of the standards of fair dealing and professional conduct that are ap-
plicable to a stockbroker when dealing with a customer.142 Although 
misrepresentations or nondisclosure of information may accompany a 
violation of the suitability rule, the rule itself is a substantive re-
quirement that imposes on a broker-dealer “an obligation not to 
recommend a course of action clearly contrary to the best interests of 
the customer, whether or not there was full disclosure.”143 
 
 
 138.  The NASD is the only national securities association. There are nine active national 
securities exchanges, the largest of which is the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). SEC, 2000 
ANNUAL REPORT 38, 145–55 (2001). 
 139. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1994). 
 140. SEC REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. DOC. NO. 95, at 
228 (1963) [hereinafter SEC SPECIAL STUDY]. 
 141. NASD Rule 2310, supra note 1, at 4261. Before the NASD recodified its rules in 
1996, the suitability rule was Article III, section 2 of the NASD’s Rules of Fair Practice. 
 142. Although the majority view is that a violation of an SRO rule, including the suitabil-
ity rule, does not give rise to a private right of action, such violations may be taken into ac-
count in determining whether a broker acted reasonably and in accord with the prevailing 
standards of the securities industry. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 333 (5th 
Cir. 1981). 
 143. In re Powell & McGowan, 41 S.E.C. 933, Exchange Act Release No. 7302, 1964 
WL 66868 (Apr. 24, 1964). 
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By its terms, Rule 2310 applies only to recommendations. The 
rule is not implicated where a broker sells to a customer a non-
recommended security. This raises the question of what constitutes a 
recommendation. In 1996, the NASD stated that it would deem a 
transaction to be “recommended” when a broker “brings a specific 
security to the attention of the customer through any means, includ-
ing, but not limited to, direct telephone communication, the delivery 
of promotional material through the mail, or the transmission of 
electronic messages.”144 Subsequently, the staff of NASD Regulation, 
Inc., the NASD’s regulatory subsidiary, qualified this broad defini-
tion of the term “recommend” by stating that a suitability obligation 
does not apply in situations where the broker acts solely as an order-
taker, that every statement that mentions a security would not neces-
sarily be considered a recommendation, and that the term “recom-
mended” does not depend on whether an order was deemed “solic-
ited or unsolicited.”145 The SEC takes the position that the NASD 
rule is violated even where the broker makes an unsuitable recom-
mendation in response to the customer’s expressed wish to speculate 
in the market. As a fiduciary, a broker may only make recommenda-
tions that are in the best interests of his customer, even when the 
recommendations contradict the customer’s wishes.146 However, 
there is no bright-line test as to what constitutes a recommendation 
for purposes of Rule 2310, but rather a spectrum of situations, from 
a broker acting merely as an order-taker, at the one extreme, and the 
urging by a broker of a customer to buy a particular security, at the 
other. In between are a variety of situations in which it may not be 
entirely clear whether or not the rule applies. 
Although misrepresentations or nondisclosure of information 
may accompany a violation of the NASD suitability rule, the rule it-
self is a substantive requirement that imposes on a broker-dealer “an 
obligation not to recommend a course of action clearly contrary to 
 
 144. NASD Notice to Members No. 96-60, 1996 NASD LEXIS 76 (Sept. 1996). In 
2001, the NASD published a “policy statement” advising its members as to the kinds of com-
munications over the Internet that constituted “recommendations” under Rule 2310. Online 
Suitability, NASD Notice to Members No. 01-23, 2001 WL 278614 (Mar. 19, 2001). 
 145. See N.Y. COUNTY LAWYERS’ ASS’N, STRATEGIES FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN 
THE NEW E-COMMERCE ECONOMY 5–6 (Jan. 19, 2000). 
 146. In re Reynolds, [1991–92 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,901, at 
82,311 (SEC Dec. 4, 1991) (holding that broker violated NASD suitability rule where he en-
gaged in aggressive and speculative trading on behalf of church fund, even if the church board 
did suggest that he engage in this type of trading). 
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the best interests of the customer, whether or not there was full dis-
closure.”147 Unlike Rule 10b-5, the principal antifraud rule of the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, NASD Rule 2310, does not re-
quire that the brokerage firm act with scienter (i.e., intent or 
recklessness).148 A broker who recommends the purchase or sale of a 
security to a customer without having a reasonable belief that it is 
suitable may be sanctioned by the NASD for acting negligently.149 
Because of the inclusive membership of the NASD and perhaps 
also because the NASD rule was the earliest suitability rule to be 
adopted by any regulator, the rule has been highly influential in the 
development of the doctrine. Nevertheless, although violation of the 
NASD suitability rule (or any other SRO rule) subjects a broker-
dealer to possible disciplinary action, the majority view of the courts 
is that no private right of action can be implied from such a viola-
tion.150 Rules such as NASD Rule 2310, however, are admissible, in 
lawsuits and arbitrations based on negligence or breach of fiduciary  
 
 
 147. In re Powell & McGowan, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 933, 1964 WL 66868, at *2 (1964). 
 148. Erdos v. SEC, 742 F.2d, 507, 508 (9th Cir. 1984). The Supreme Court held in 
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), that a defendant cannot violate section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 unless he acts with scienter. 
 149. Professor Mundheim has pointed out that the suitability doctrine is closely related 
to section 2-315 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which provides that a seller of goods 
makes an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, where the seller has reason to 
know the particular purpose for which the goods are acquired and where the buyer relies on 
the seller’s skill or judgment in selecting or furnishing goods which are suitable for that pur-
pose. Mundheim, supra note 2, at 452. Article 2 of the code, however, applies only to sales of 
goods, not to sales of securities. 
 150.  The courts are divided on the question of whether an SRO violation can give rise to 
an implied private right of action, but the prevailing view on this question is negative. See 
Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1980) (no implied private right of action 
for violation of an SRO rule). But see Buttrey v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
410 F.2d 135, 142 (7th Cir. 1969) (private right of action for violation of an SRO rule may be 
implied if the defendant’s conduct was tantamount to fraud); see also cases cited in POSER, 
BROKER-DEALER LAW, supra note 1, § 2.06[A], at 2-107 to 2-111. 
The majority view on this question has been sharply criticized by the California interme-
diate appellate court: 
It may be asserted the proposed [suitability] guidelines are merely ethical standards 
and should not be a predicate for civil liability. Good ethics should not be ignored 
by the law. It would be inconsistent to suggest that a person should be defrocked as 
a member of his calling, and yet not be liable for the injury which resulted from his 
acts or omissions. 
Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 69 Cal. Rptr. 222, 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968); 
see also LOUIS LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 834 (2d ed. 1988). 
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duty, as evidence of the standard of conduct that should be applied 
to members of the securities industry.151 
2. Recommendations to institutional customers under the NASD 
rule 
Rule 2310 applies to recommendations made to institutional as 
well as individual customers, although not in exactly the same man-
ner. Although Part (a) of the rule, which is quoted above, by its 
terms applies to all customers, Part (b) applies only to individual cus-
tomers. Part (b) requires a broker, when recommending a security to 
a non-institutional customer, to make reasonable efforts to obtain 
information concerning the customer’s financial status, tax status, in-
vestment objectives, and any other information that the broker con-
siders to be reasonable.152 
The NASD has made it clear that Part (a) of the rule does not 
implicitly exempt from its requirements recommendations made to 
institutional customers. In 1996, the NASD adopted an interpreta-
tion of its suitability rule (the “Suitability Interpretation”) that de-
fines the suitability obligations of brokerage firms to institutional 
customers.153 The NASD considers an institutional customer to be 
any entity other than a natural person, but suggests that the Suitabil-
ity Interpretation should normally be applied only to institutions 
with at least $10 million invested in securities.154 
The NASD’s Suitability Interpretation limits, but does not elimi-
nate, the responsibility of a broker to determine the suitability of its 
recommendations to an institutional customer. Under the interpreta-
tion, the extent of the responsibility depends upon the investment 
sophistication of the customer and the nature and circumstances of 
the relationship between the broker and customer. The broker must 
determine the suitability of a recommended investment unless the 
 
 151. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 333 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 152. Twenty-five years before the NASD adopted Part (b) of Rule 2310, the SEC had 
held that the suitability rule imposed an implied duty on a NASD member to investigate its 
customers’ situation before it recommended securities to the customer. In re Greenberg, 40 
S.E.C. 133 (1960); see also Erdos, 742 F.2d at 508. 
 153. NASD Rule 2310-3, supra note 35, at 4265. 
 154. Id. The NASD does not explain why it determined that the cutoff should be $10 
million. Presumably, the determination was based on the assumption that an institutional in-
vestor with a securities portfolio of under that amount is unlikely to be able to afford profes-
sional financial management. 
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broker is satisfied that the customer has both a general capability to 
evaluate investment risks and a specific capability to evaluate the risks 
of a particular investment.155 If the broker has reasonable grounds for 
concluding that an institutional customer is making independent in-
vestment decisions and is capable of independently evaluating in-
vestment risk, the member’s obligation to determine that a recom-
mendation is suitable is fulfilled. Where an institutional customer has 
delegated decision-making authority to an agent, such as an invest-
ment advisor or a bank trust department, the broker-dealer must de-
termine the ability of the agent to evaluate the investment risk. 
Thus, a broker’s suitability obligation to an institutional cus-
tomer is narrower than to an individual customer, for whom the 
broker is required to determine the suitability of any investment that 
it recommends, regardless of the customer’s investment sophistica-
tion. A possible explanation for the difference in approach is that 
since institutional investors are likely to be under professional man-
agement, there is no need to burden a broker-dealer with a suitabil-
ity responsibility once the broker-dealer has determined that the in-
stitutional manager is capable of independently evaluating the 
recommended securities.156 Although this argument is also plausible 
 
 155. The Suitability Interpretation states in part: 
The two most important considerations in determining the scope of a member’s 
suitability obligations in making recommendations to an institutional customer are 
the customer’s capability to evaluate investment risk independently and the extent to 
which the customer is exercising independent judgment in evaluating a member’s 
recommendation. A member must determine, based on the information available to 
it, the customer’s capability to evaluate investment risk. In some cases, the member 
may conclude that the customer is not capable of making independent investment 
decisions in general. In other cases, the institutional customer may have general ca-
pability, but may not be able to understand a particular type of instrument or its 
risk. This is more likely to arise with relatively new types of instruments, or those 
with significantly different risk or volatility characteristics than other investments 
generally made by the institution. If a customer is either generally not capable of 
evaluating investment risk or lacks sufficient capability to evaluate the particular 
product, the scope of a member’s customer-specific obligations under the suitability 
rule would not be diminished by the fact that the member was dealing with an insti-
tutional customer. On the other hand, the fact that a customer initially needed help 
understanding a potential investment need not necessarily imply that the customer 
did not ultimately develop an understanding and make an independent investment 
decision. 
Id. at 4264. 
 156. The Interpretation provides that, in determining the institutional customer’s (or 
agent’s) capability to evaluate investment risk, the broker should consider the following factors: 
(1)  The customer’s use of consultants, investment advisors, or bank trust depart-
2POS.DOC 3/5/02  9:06 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
1534 
where a broker-dealer recommends securities to a sophisticated indi-
vidual investor, the NASD rule does not limit a broker-dealer’s re-
sponsibility in the same way in that situation. 
Despite the more limited application of the NASD suitability rule 
to institutional investors, the Suitability Interpretation makes it clear 
that a broker’s obligation to determine the suitability of recommen-
dations applies to recommendations made to institutional as well as 
individual investors. 
3. Suitability and the professional status of the securities industry 
The NASD’s position in this area is not unrelated to the fact that 
broker-dealers wish to gain professional status as advisors, equivalent 
to that of a doctor, lawyer, or accountant. Brokerage firms seek to 
encourage customers to believe that their salespersons are profes-
sionals upon whom the customers can rely for expert investment ad-
vice. This is made patently clear by their advertising, which empha-
sizes that brokerage firms can be trusted to give investment advice, 
designating their salespersons as “financial consultants,” “financial 
advisors,” or “account executives”; and in other ways in their cus-
tomer contacts.157 Brokers seek the trust and confidence not only of 
individuals but of institutional investors as well.158 Clearly, the NASD 
 
ments. 
(2) The customer’s general level of experience in financial markets and specific ex-
perience with the type of investment under consideration. 
(3) The customer’s ability to understand the economic features of the security. 
(4) The customer’s ability to independently evaluate how market developments 
would affect the security. 
(5) The complexity of the security. 
The Suitability Interpretation states that the above factors are guidelines and that the 
presence or absence of any of them is not dispositive of the determination of suitability. “Such 
a determination can only be made on a case-by-case basis taking into consideration all the facts 
and circumstances of a particular member/customer relationship, assessed in the context of a 
particular transaction.” Id. at 4265. 
 157. A review of the web sites of several brokerage firms shows that they encourage the 
public to depend on them for investment advice. Typical slogans are “Advising Investors for 
Over a Century” (Legg Mason), “Your Guide to the Financial World” (First Union Securi-
ties), “We Help You Invest Responsibly” (Fidelity Investments), “We want your business, we’ll 
earn your trust” (Ferris Baker Watts), and “We Measure Success One Investor at a Time” 
(Morgan Stanley). 
Titles such as “financial advisor” or “financial consultant” “are pregnant with important 
legal meaning,” since they invite the customer to enter into a relationship of “trust, confidence 
and dependence” with the broker. Rapp, supra note 3, at 190 n.3. 
 158. Paine Webber, for example, provides consulting services to institutions and wealthy 
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considers the suitability requirement a requisite of the professional 
status to which the securities industry aspires. The Suitability Inter-
pretation recognizes that when a suitability obligation is imposed on 
a broker, it means that this aspiration is being taken seriously. 
The Suitability Interpretation identifies the institutional custom-
ers to which a brokerage firm owes a suitability duty on the basis of 
the investment sophistication of the institution’s financial officers. It 
accurately reflects the reality, which has been ignored by some courts 
and legal writers, that many institutional investors lack both sophisti-
cation and the financial resources to hire sophisticated financial offi-
cers. At the same time, the interpretation relieves a broker-dealer of 
any responsibility for the suitability of the recommendations that it 
makes, once the broker-dealer has satisfied itself that the financial of-
ficer is capable of evaluating the broker’s recommendations. In view 
of the public responsibilities of broker-dealers and the difficulty in 
determining whether an institution is sophisticated, this is question-
able public policy, to which I will return later in this article.159 
4. Suitability rules of other SROs 
Most securities-industry SROs have suitability rules, but these 
rules have neither the importance nor the influence of the NASD 
rule. The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (“MSRB”), which 
is the SRO established by the SEC pursuant to its authority under 
the 1934 Act to regulate the activities of dealers in municipal securi-
ties,160 has a suitability rule similar to the NASD rule. The MSRB 
rule places an affirmative duty of inquiry on the dealer with respect 
 
individuals. Among the services it offers are “asset allocation advice and the evaluation, rec-
ommendation and ongoing analysis of investment managers.” UBS/PaineWebber, Corporate 
& Institutional Services Homepage, at http://www.ubspaineWebber.com/index.html (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2001). 
 159. For a favorable comment on the NASD’s Suitability Interpretation, suggesting that 
the Interpretation is applicable not only in NASD disciplinary actions but also in resolving dis-
putes between institutions and brokers, see Wallance & Carron, supra note 20, at 1. 
Although these guidelines are not intended to provide a “safe harbor” for dealers 
who sell securities to institutional customers, they provide a balanced and realistic 
framework for resolving suitability disputes between institutional customers and 
their brokers. Their most innovative feature is the recognition that an institutional 
investor that can evaluate the risks of its investments and make independent deci-
sions is in a better position than a broker to judge the suitability of its investments. 
Id. at 1 (footnote omitted). 
 160. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4 (1994). 
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to recommendations to non-institutional accounts. In addition, a 
dealer is required to make a suitability determination before recom-
mending a municipal security transaction to (or exercising discretion 
on behalf of) any account, including an institutional account.161 
The New York Stock Exchange does not have a general suitabil-
ity rule, but the exchange’s “know your customer” rule requires 
member firms to use “due diligence to learn the essential facts rela-
tive to every customer [and] every order.”162 Although this rule was 
originally designed to protect stock exchange members from dishon-
est or insolvent customers, it is presently regarded as protecting in-
vestors from being induced to purchase securities whose risks they 
can ill afford.163 The NYSE “leaves to the member organization’s 
judgment the determination of which facts are ‘essential’ in the vary-
ing circumstances of each new account.”164 By its terms, the “know 
your customer” rule applies to institutional as well as individual ac-
counts, and to transactions initiated by a customer as well as transac-
tions recommended by the broker.165 
Because of the complexity and special risks inherent in put and 
call options, the SROs on which options are traded have adopted 
special suitability rules for customers’ option accounts.166 Institu-
tional customers are not excluded from the rules’ coverage. These 
rules require that a broker, in recommending an “opening transac-
tion” (i.e., a transaction that establishes or increases the customer’s 
long or short position in an option), must have a reasonable basis for 
believing “that the customer has such knowledge and experience in 
financial matters that he may reasonably be expected to be capable of 
evaluating the risks of the recommended transaction, and is finan-
 
 161. Mun. Sec. Rulemaking Bd., MSRB Rule G-19, MSRB MANUAL (CCH) ¶ 3591 
(1994). 
 162. N.Y. Stock Exchange, NYSE Rule 405, NYSE GUIDE (CCH) 3696 (2000). 
 163. LOUIS LOSS, “FRAUD” AND CIVIL LIABILITY UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES 
LAWS 31 (1983); Sam Scott Miller & Robert D. Popper, Discount Brokers’ Obligations Under 
the “Suitability” Doctrine, 5 No. 11 INSIGHTS 7 (Nov. 1991). 
 164. N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE, PATTERNS OF SUPERVISION 41 (1982). 
 165. A booklet prepared by the NYSE to assist its members in fulfilling their supervisory 
responsibilities lists thirty-one items of information that “may be included in the new account 
form of an institutional client, if deemed ‘essential’ for the particular account.” Id. at 44. 
 166. Options have been a popular form of investment since 1973, when trading in stan-
dardized listed options commenced on the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). For a 
description of the listed options market, see Poser, supra note 62, at 585–92. Curiously, the 
SROs have not adopted special suitability rules for the sale of derivatives (other than options). 
However the NASD Suitability Interpretation may be considered to be such a rule. 
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cially able to bear the risks of the recommended position in the op-
tion contract.”167 Thus, the SROs’ suitability rules expressly require 
that opening options transactions be recommended only to custom-
ers with sufficient investment sophistication. 
In conclusion, it may be said that although the suitability rules of 
the NASD and other SROs, and the NYSE’s “know your customer 
rule,” do not give rise to a private cause of action, these rules have 
established standards of conduct for the securities industry, which are 
relevant in lawsuits brought for violation of SEC Rule 10b-5 or for 
breach of fiduciary duty. Thus, the NASD’s Suitability Interpretation 
is likely to have an influence on courts and arbitrators in determining 
whether a broker should be liable for recommending an unsuitable 
security to an institutional investor. 
B. Suitability Under Rule 10b-5 
Rule 10b-5 is the general antifraud rule of the SEC. It prohibits 
deceptive conduct and misstatements and omissions of material fact 
by any person, if the conduct is in connection with the purchase or 
sale of a security.168 Although Rule 10b-5 does not expressly give a 
private plaintiff a cause of action, the Supreme Court has held that 
there is an implied private right of action based on a violation of the 
rule.169 In order to establish liability under 10b-5, it is not enough 
for a plaintiff to prove that the defendant violated the NASD (or 
other SRO) suitability rule; the plaintiff must prove all the required 
elements of a 10b-5 violation. These elements are: (1) a misstate-
ment or omission, or other fraudulent device; (2) a purchase or sale 
of a security in connection with the fraud; (3) scienter (i.e., inten-
tional or reckless conduct) by the defendant; (4) materiality of the 
misstated or omitted fact; (5) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; and 
(6) damage resulting from the misstatement, omission, or fraudulent 
device.170 
 
 167. See N.Y. Stock Exchange, NYSE Rule 723, NYSE GUIDE (CCH) 4561 (1999); see 
also Chicago Board Options Exchange R. 9.9, CBOE CONSTITUTION AND RULES (CCH) 
2140 (1999). 
 168. For the text of Rule 10b-5, see supra note 8. 
 169. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (“[A] private 
right of action under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 has been consistently recog-
nized for more than 35 years. The existence of this implied remedy is simply beyond peradven-
ture.”). 
 170. See Platsis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 946 F.2d 38, 40 (6th Cir. 1991). 
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The federal courts have held for over twenty years that a broker’s 
unsuitable recommendation to a customer may constitute a violation 
of Rule 10b-5. In 1978, in Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc.,171 
the Second Circuit held that a broker’s intentional recommendation 
of an unsuitable security to an individual customer was “an act, prac-
tice or course of business which [operated] as a fraud or deceit” 
upon the customer, in violation of subsection (c) of Rule 10b-5. The 
Clark court held that, in order to establish a 10b-5 claim for unsuit-
ability, the customer must prove that (1) the recommended securi-
ties were unsuitable for her even though the broker knew or rea-
sonably assumed that the securities were unsuitable; (2) the broker 
intended for the customer to rely on his recommendation; and (3) 
the customer relied on the broker’s recommendation.172 
Clark did not explicitly deal with the question of how an unsuit-
able recommendation satisfies the requirement of Rule 10b-5 that, in 
order to violate the rule, there must be a misstatement, omission, or 
other fraudulent device.173 Later federal cases, however, have 
adopted two alternative theories of liability in suitability cases.174 The 
first theory is that the broker misrepresented to his customer that the 
recommended security was suitable or (owing a duty to disclose) 
failed to disclose to the customer that the recommendation was un-
suitable.175 The second theory is that the broker engaged in fraud by 
 
 171. 583 F.2d 594, 599 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 172. Id. at 598. See In re Richards, Case No. 4-88-04402 TS6 Chapter 7, 1990 Bankr. 
LEXIS 607, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 1990). 
 173. The Supreme Court held in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), 
that deception was an essential element of a violation of Rule 10b-5: “Thus,” the Court ruled, 
“the claim of fraud and fiduciary breach in this complaint states a cause of action under any 
part of Rule 10b-5 only if the conduct alleged can be fairly viewed as ‘manipulative or decep-
tive’ within the meaning of the statute.” Id. at 473–74. The Supreme Court subsequently held 
that conduct cannot be manipulative unless it also is deceptive. See Schreiber v. Burlington 
Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985). 
 174. See O’Connor v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 965 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1992); City of San 
Jose v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc., No. C 84-20601 RFP, 1991 WL 352485 (N.D. 
Cal. June 6, 1991). 
 175. Under this theory, the broker is liable because he made a misstatement of, or omit-
ted to state, a material fact. An omission of a material fact gives rise to liability if the omission 
makes an otherwise truthful statement misleading. See Rule 10b-5(2). Even if the broker made 
no statement at all to the customer, his omission to disclose the unsuitability of a recom-
mended security may be the basis for liability if the broker had a duty to speak—a duty that 
arose from the relationship of trust and confidence between broker and customer. Chiarella v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230–31 (1980). Such a duty may arise from the existence of a 
fiduciary relationship. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654–55 (1983). 
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his conduct, because recommending a security to a customer with 
the knowledge that it is unsuitable, or with reckless disregard for its 
suitability, is an inherently deceptive act and constitutes a “device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud” the customer, or an “act, practice, or 
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or de-
ceit” on the customer.176 Institutional investors, however, have not 
had much success in asserting suitability claims under either of these 
two theories of liability. 
1. The misrepresentation/omission theory of liability: The problem 
of justifiable reliance 
An institutional investor who claims that a broker-dealer misrep-
resented (or failed to disclose) the unsuitability of the securities that 
it sold to the institution must prove that it justifiably relied on the 
misrepresentation or omission. Under the majority view of the 
courts, the plaintiff, whether an individual or an institution, must 
show not only that it actually relied on the defendant’s misrepresen-
tation or omission, but also that the reliance was justifiable. In order 
to recover, the plaintiff must demonstrate that it exercised due care 
and reasonable diligence in ascertaining the truth about the invest-
ment.177 Even an unsophisticated investor may not be able to over-
come this requirement,178 but for a sophisticated investor the re-
quirement is likely to be insuperable. 
A 10b-5 unsuitability claim that is based on the “misrepresenta-
tion/omission” theory is considered to be a subset of an ordinary 
 
 176. See Rule 10b-5(a) and (c); see also O’Connor, 965 F.2d at 897. 
 177. Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1030–31 (2d Cir. 1993); Myers 
v. Finkle, 950 F.2d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 1991); Laird v. Integrated Res., Inc., 897 F.2d 826, 
837–38 (5th Cir. 1990); Bruschi v. Brown, 876 F.2d 1526, 1529 (11th Cir. 1989); Kennedy 
v. Josephthal & Co., 814 F.2d 798, 805 (1st Cir. 1987); Molecular Tech. Corp. v. Valentine, 
925 F.2d 910, 918 (6th Cir. 1991). 
 178. In E.F. Hutton, several presumably unsophisticated, income-oriented customers 
sought to recover losses suffered as a result of purchasing risky limited partnership interests, 
asserting that these securities were unsuitable for them. The court affirmed the district court’s 
dismissal of the action on the ground that the plaintiffs’ reliance on the defendants’ oral mis-
statements was not justifiable as a matter of law, because the plaintiffs had been provided with 
a prospectus that contained accurate written disclosures of the risks of the investment. E.F. 
Hutton, 991 F.2d at 1032. 
Other circuits, however, have held that, depending on the circumstances, a plaintiff’s re-
liance on oral misrepresentations may be reasonable even where the misrepresentations were 
contradicted by contemporaneous written disclosures. See Myers, 950 F.2d at 167–69 (4th 
Cir. 1991); Bruschi, 876 F.2d at 1529–30 (11th Cir. 1989). 
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misrepresentation or omission claim under the rule.179 A plaintiff 
who brings such an action must plead and prove that (1) the rec-
ommended securities (or securities purchased for a discretionary ac-
count) were unsuited to the investor’s needs; (2) the defendant knew 
or reasonably believed that the securities were unsuitable; (3) the de-
fendant, with scienter, recommended (or purchased for the cus-
tomer) the securities anyway; (4) the defendant made a misstatement 
of (or, owing a duty to the plaintiff, failed to disclose) material in-
formation; and (5) the plaintiff justifiably relied to its detriment on 
the defendant’s fraudulent conduct.180 
In a suitability lawsuit brought by an institutional investor based 
on the misrepresentation/omission theory, a major roadblock to es-
tablishing liability under Rule 10b-5 is the need to prove that the 
plaintiff’s reliance was justifiable.181 The rule requiring justifiable reli-
ance by the plaintiff is said to be based on two policy reasons: first, 
that only those who have pursued their own interests with care and 
good faith should qualify for the judicially created 10b-5 remedies; 
and, second, that requiring plaintiffs to invest carefully promotes the 
antifraud policies of the federal securities laws and engenders stability 
in the markets.182 
Although the federal circuits have defined the standard for de-
termining whether the plaintiff’s reliance was justifiable in different 
ways, the prevailing standard is, at least ostensibly, one of reckless-
ness, i.e., “whether the plaintiff . . . refused to investigate in disre-
 
 179. Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1032 (4th Cir. 
1997); City of San Jose, 1991 WL 352485, at *2. 
 180. E.F. Hutton, 991 F.2d at 1031. 
 181. The justifiable reliance requirement applies to any misrepresentation claim brought 
under Rule 10b-5, not only to a suitability claim. The courts are not unanimous, however, in 
imposing a duty of inquiry on the plaintiff. See Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt 
Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 1546 (7th Cir. 1990) (disallowing the securities buyer recovery 
unless it has tried to verify the seller’s statements would impede the disclosure objective of the 
securities laws). 
The justifiable reliance requirement can, alternatively, be viewed as a materiality re-
quirement. In other words, defendant’s misstatements “were such obvious hooey that no rea-
sonable investor would have been taken in,” or would have viewed the defendant’s misstate-
ments or omissions “as altering the ‘total mix’ of information made available.” Astor 
Chauffered Limousine, 910 F.2d at 1546 (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 
438, 449 (1976)); see also Westcap II, 230 F.3d 717, 727–33 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding no 
10b-5 liability because defendant’s prediction of future trend of interest rates was not a mate-
rial misstatement, and defendant’s failure to warn plaintiff about risk was not a material omis-
sion). 
 182. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th Cir. 1977). 
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gard of a risk known to him or so obvious that he must be taken to 
have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that 
harm would follow.”183 Since the Supreme Court has held that the 
defendant in a 10b-5 action can be liable only if he acted with sci-
enter (i.e., either intentionally or recklessly),184 it would be anoma-
lous to bar a plaintiff from recovery if his conduct rose only to the 
level of negligence. Nevertheless, some of the cases appear to apply a 
negligence standard to the plaintiff. Thus, some courts, instead of 
requiring that the plaintiff justifiably relied on the defendant’s mis-
representation, have instead framed the requirement as one requiring 
that the plaintiff exercise “due diligence” in handling her invest-
ments. The due diligence standard, somewhat confusingly, can be 
interpreted as either one of recklessness or negligence.185 
In Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc.,186 a leading case on the subject of the 
plaintiff’s reliance requirement under Rule 10b-5, the Tenth Circuit 
stated: “Only when the plaintiff’s conduct rises to a level of culpable 
conduct comparable to that of the defendant’s will reliance be unjus-
tifiable. In this circuit, such conduct must amount to at least reckless 
behavior.”187 The court listed the following “relevant factors” for de-
termining whether reliance was justifiable: 
(1) the sophistication and expertise of the plaintiff in financial and 
securities matters; (2) the existence of long standing business or 
personal relationships; (3) access to the relevant information; (4) 
the existence of a fiduciary relationship; (5) concealment of the 
fraud; (6) the opportunity to detect the fraud; (7) whether the 
 
 183. Laird v. Integrated Res., Inc., 897 F.2d 826, 837 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Stephen-
son v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc., 839 F.2d 1095, 1098 (5th Cir. 1988); Dupuy, 
551 F.2d at 1020)); see also Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1517 (10th Cir. 1983) 
(“At a minimum, though, ‘a plaintiff may not reasonably or justifiably rely on a misrepresenta-
tion where its falsity is palpable.’”) (quoting Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 694 (10th 
Cir. 1976)). For a comprehensive rundown of the cases on plaintiff’s reliance in a 10b-5 ac-
tion, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 55, § 4.1 n.11. 
 184. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
 185. See Royal Am. Managers, Inc. v. IRC Holding Corp., 885 F.2d 1011, 1015–16 (2d 
Cir. 1989) (“A showing of reliance may be defeated . . . where defendant establishes that plain-
tiff should have discovered the true facts. This has been called the due diligence test, to which, 
traditionally, a negligence standard has applied. . . . [H]owever, the degree of diligence to 
which plaintiffs are held has been diminished to minimal diligence. More specifically, a plaintiff 
bears only the burden of negating his own ‘recklessness,’ once the issue of diligence is raised by 
defendant.”) (citations omitted); see also Dupuy, 551 F.2d at 1014. 
 186. 708 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1983). 
 187. Id. at 1516 (citations omitted). 
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plaintiff initiated the stock transaction or sought to expedite the 
transaction; and (8) the generality or specificity of the misrepresen-
tations.188 
However, the court diluted the usefulness of its list of factors by 
adding the comment that “[n]o single factor is determinative; all 
relevant factors must be considered and balanced to determine 
whether reliance was justified.”189 
The majority view is that the plaintiff has the burden of proving 
that its reliance was justifiable (or that it performed due diligence).190 
The test of whether the reliance is justifiable is said to be a subjective 
one, based on whether it would be justifiable for an investor with the 
attributes of the plaintiff, rather than the average investor.191 The 
first of the Zobrist list of relevant factors, the plaintiff’s sophistica-
tion, is probably the most important in a 10b-5 suitability case be-
cause a reasonable person who is a sophisticated investor may be ex-
pected to investigate the risks of each security that a broker 
recommends to it.192 Consequently, it is unlikely that any reliance by 
a sophisticated investor on the broker’s misrepresentation would be 
justifiable.193 If investment officers of institutions are presumed to be 
sophisticated, then institutions cannot bring a successful 10b-5 ac-
tion unless they can overcome the presumption. If the presumption 




 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 1516–17. 
 190. See Jackvony v. RIHT Fin. Corp., 873 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1989); Harsco Corp. v. 
Segui, 91 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 1996); Sowell v. Butcher, 926 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1991); Cooke v. 
Manufactured Homes, Inc., 998 F.2d 1256 (4th Cir. 1993); Schlesinger v. Herzog, 2 F.3d 
135 (5th Cir. 1993); Wright v. Nat’l Warranty Co., 953 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1992); Grubb v. 
FDIC, 868 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1989); Ross v. Bank S., N.A., 885 F.2d 723 (11th Cir. 
1989). 
 191. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1016 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 192. One court has stated that a plaintiff’s reliance will not be presumed to be unreason-
able just because the plaintiff was a sophisticated investor, but that the plaintiff’s knowledge 
and experience will be examined in light of the defendant’s misrepresentations and omissions. 
Nye v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 588 F.2d 1189, 1197 (8th Cir. 1978). 
 193. “[T]he most relevant [of the Zobrist factors] to a suitability claim would seem to be 
the sophistication and expertise of the plaintiff in financial and securities matters, the existence 
of ‘longstanding business or personal relationships,’ the existence of a fiduciary relationship, 
the opportunity to detect the fraud, and the generality or specificity of the misrepresentations.” 
Bar of N.Y., supra note 83, at 88. 
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Because the private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 was not in the legislative enactment but was subsequently im-
plied by the courts, Congress did not indicate whether reliance (let 
alone justifiable reliance) by the plaintiff was an essential element of 
the cause of action.194 The courts have overwhelmingly held that a 
plaintiff must have justifiably relied on the defendant’s misrepresen-
tations or omissions or, alternatively, that the plaintiff acted with due 
diligence in the handling of its investments.195 This requirement is 
troubling, since, as described above, many courts seem to equate due 
diligence with non-negligent conduct. Moreover, the justifiable reli-
ance requirement, as so interpreted, is inconsistent both with the 
common law of torts and with the investment-protection purpose of 
the federal securities laws.196 “At common law, contributory negli-
gence [has never been] a defense to an intentional tort, on the 
ground that D’s purpose to harm and P’s failure to take protection 
were wrongs of a wholly different order.”197 Under comparative neg-
ligence principles, which now operate in nearly every state, a plain-
tiff’s negligence may be used by the defendant to mitigate damages, 
even where the defendant acted recklessly, but is not a complete bar 
to recovery. 
 
 194. The “justifiable reliance” requirement, like the other elements of the private right of 
action under Rule 10b-5, derives from the common law tort of deceit. See LOUIS LOSS & 
JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 846 (4th ed. 2000). 
Although the courts have uniformly held that reliance by the plaintiff is an essential ele-
ment of a 10b-5 claim, the Supreme Court has attempted to ease the difficulties of proving 
reliance. In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1971), the Court held 
that where a 10b-5 violation involves “primarily a failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance 
is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material. . . .” 
Thus, it would appear that a plaintiff claiming that a broker failed to inform it that recom-
mended securities were unsuitable would not be required to prove reliance. Nevertheless, very 
few of the suitability cases discussing the question of justifiable reliance contain any reference 
to Affiliated Ute. See cases cited supra note 177. But see Memphis Hous. Auth. v. Paine, 
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 108, 113 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) (noting that Af-
filiated Ute requires the court to assume reliance if there were material omissions). 
 195. Dupuy, 551 F.2d at 1014. 
 196. In Dupuy, the court recognized that the relevant policies behind tort law and the 
federal securities laws are similar: to deter intentional misconduct, to protect investors against 
fraud, and to promote ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing in the securities markets. 
Id. at 1018–19. 
 197. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 212 (1999). In fact, even where the defendant was 
merely negligent almost all of the states have abandoned contributory negligence in favor of a 
system of comparative negligence. Id. at 211. Thus, in a negligence case, a plaintiff who was 
negligent may be entitled to some recovery whereas, anomalously, a negligent plaintiff who 
was the victim of an intentional securities fraud is likely to be denied any recovery. 
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Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are antifraud provisions, under 
which there can be no liability unless the defendant acted with sci-
enter, i.e., intentionally or recklessly.198 As Judge Easterbrook has 
stated: “[S]ecurities fraud is an intentional tort, and . . . contributory 
negligence (failure to investigate independently) is not a defense 
when the tort is intentional.”199 If a negligent victim of a defendant’s 
negligent conduct can recover, a negligent victim of a fraud certainly 
should not be barred from recovery. According to the Restatement: 
“The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation of fact is justified in 
relying upon its truth, although he might have ascertained the falsity 
of the representation had he made an investigation.”200 The majority 
of jurisdictions have held the plaintiff’s negligence should not defeat 
a fraud claim and that the plaintiff is not required to conduct a due 
diligence investigation when the misrepresentation concerned mat-
ters peculiarly within the defendant’s knowledge.201 Two principal 
reasons have been cited for this rule: first, the policy of deterring in-
tentional misconduct outweighs the policy of deterring negligent 
behavior; and, second, considerations of equity dictate that where 
one party is more culpable than the other, the more culpable party 
should bear the loss.202 Nevertheless, decisions interpreting Rule 
10b-5 deny recovery to a negligent plaintiff who is victimized by a 
defendant acting with intent to defraud or recklessly, although 
“[b]oth tort law and federal securities policy support imposing on 
the plaintiff only a standard of care not exceeding that imposed on 
the defendant.”203 
It is at least debatable whether a 10b-5 plaintiff should be limited 
by common law precepts. While traditional tort law can supply some 
guidance to the courts when interpreting the federal securities laws, 
the courts are not bound by it. The Supreme Court has stated that 
the securities laws were enacted “to rectify perceived deficiencies in 
the available common law protections by establishing higher stan-
 
 198. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
 199. Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 1546 
(7th Cir. 1990). 
 200. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 540 (1976). 
 201. Id. § 540 app. (1989) (citing Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 80 (2d Cir. 
1980)). 
 202. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1018 (5th Cir. 1977); Zobrist v. Coal-X, 
Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1983); see also Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. 
Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985); infra text accompanying note 226. 
 203. Dupuy, 551 F.2d at 1020. 
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dards of conduct in the securities industry.”204 As the Second Circuit 
stated in an early securities fraud case: “We need not stop to de-
cide . . . how far common-law fraud was shown. For the business of 
selling investment securities has been considered one peculiarly in 
need of regulation for the protection of the investor.”205 It is incon-
sistent with the overriding investor-protection purpose of the securi-
ties laws to deny recovery to a municipality, college, or other institu-
tional investor, where a broker earned enormous commissions by 
intentionally or recklessly recommending unsuitable securities, even 
where the institution’s investment officers did not exercise due dili-
gence, owing to overwork, gullibility, insufficient experience, or sim-
ply negligence. Furthermore, the psychological “chemistry” and in-
teraction between the broker and the investment officer may not be 
adequately described by conventional legal terms such as justifiable 
reliance or due diligence. It has been pointed out that some brokers, 
tempted by “subtle opportunism,” will manipulate the motivation of 
their institutional customers to take inappropriate risks in order to 
create demand for the investment products they are selling.206 Such 
manipulation is a fraud because it violates the implied representation 
that a broker makes that he will place the economic interests of his 
customers ahead of his own.207 
The securities laws have broad remedial purposes that go beyond 
remedying individual wrongs.208 One of these purposes is enhancing 
the confidence of the investing public in the honesty and stability of 
the securities markets. The private right of action is a powerful tool 
that is used to enforce the securities laws and to deter brokers from 
making unsuitable recommendations. Moreover, there is a strong 
policy reason for protecting institutional investors from fraudulent 
 
 204. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (stating that the 
securities laws were designed to add to protections provided to investors by common law). The 
Supreme Court has, however, referred to common law principles when interpreting Rule 10b-
5 in other cases. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227–28 (1980). 
 205. Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943); see also LOSS & 
SELIGMAN, supra note 194, at 850 (“The fact is that the courts have repeatedly said that the 
fraud provisions in the SEC Acts . . . are not limited to circumstances that would give rise to a 
common law action for deceit.”). 
 206. See Langevoort, supra note 20, at 641. 
 207. See Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 
1998). 
 208. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1971); J.I. Case 
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964). 
2POS.DOC 3/5/02  9:06 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
1546 
sales practices, even where the financial officers of the institutions 
may not have exercised sufficient care in making their investment de-
cisions. The beneficiaries of these institutions are taxpayers, share-
holders, pensioners, depositors, and the like, who should not bear 
the burden of losses suffered as a result of unsuitable recommenda-
tions made intentionally or recklessly. Yet, ironically, the federal se-
curities laws, which were enacted to give a plaintiff additional protec-
tions not afforded by the common law, today may give less 
protection than the common law of torts to an institutional investor 
to whom a broker recommended an unsuitable investment.209 
The Supreme Court has considered the question of the plaintiff’s 
reliance in a private suit brought under Rule 10b-5 only on two oc-
casions. In both instances it relaxed the requirement by allowing a 
presumption of reliance under some circumstances.210 It is certainly 
possible that, if the question of whether a plaintiff in a suitability suit 
must prove justifiable reliance or due diligence were presented to the 
Court, the Court would similarly relax the requirement. 
2. Borrowing from sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act 
Although section 10(b) does not indicate whether a plaintiff’s re-
liance, justifiable reliance, or due diligence is a necessary element of a 
private suit, the Supreme Court has provided guidance as to how a 
court should proceed in determining the extent of a plaintiff’s im-
plied rights under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. In two cases de-
cided during the 1990s, the Supreme Court filled such gaps in the 
statutory scheme by borrowing provisions from analogous express 
civil liability provisions of the securities laws. In so doing, the Court 
hypothesized that if Congress had created a private right of action 
under section 10(b), it would have used similar provisions. In 
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,211 the 
Court borrowed the one- and three-year statute of section 9(e) of 
 
 209. See Margaret V. Sachs, The Relevance of Tort Law Doctrines to Rule 10b-5: 
Should Careless Plaintiffs Be Denied Recovery?, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 96 (1985). 
 210. In Affiliated Ute, the Court held that, in a case involving primarily a failure to dis-
close, reliance would be presumed if the facts withheld were material. 406 U.S. at 153–54. In 
Basic Inc., the Court upheld the “fraud on the market” theory, which states that, where a 
company’s stock is traded in an open and developed market, a person will be held liable for 
misleading statements even though the purchaser of the company’s stock does not directly rely 
on the misstatement.  Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988). 
 211. 501 U.S. 350 (1991). 
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the 1934 Act as the proper statute of limitations for a private lawsuit 
brought under Rule 10b-5.212 Similarly, in Central Bank of Denver, 
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,213 one of the Court’s 
grounds for rejecting any implied liability for aiding and abetting a 
10b-5 violation was that the express-liability provisions of the 1933 
and 1934 Acts do not impose liability on aiders and abettors. 
If a similar borrowing technique is used to determine what obli-
gations should be placed on a plaintiff asserting a 10b-5 claim, in-
cluding a suitability claim, it can be plausibly argued that the closest 
analogies are sections 11214 and 12(a)(2),215 the express-liability pro-
visions of the 1933 Act.216 These provisions give an investor in a 
public offering of securities the right to recover his losses from a de-
fendant who has made misstatements or omissions of material fact. 
Neither of these express-liability provisions conditions a plaintiff’s re-
covery on reliance (whether justifiable or not) on the misstatements 
or omissions; nor do sections 11 or 12(a)(2) impose any duty of due 
diligence on the plaintiff.217 These provisions bar a plaintiff from re-
 
 212. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides an express right of action to a person 
who suffers harm as the result of a violation of section 9, which prohibits various kinds of ma-
nipulative conduct. 15 U.S.C. § 78I(e) (1994). 
 213. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 214. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000). Section 11 provides that where a registration statement 
filed under the Act contains an untrue statement or omission of material fact, the purchaser of 
a registered security may sue certain designated persons, including the issuer of the security, 
any signer of the registration statement, any director, and any underwriter of the security. 
 215. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2000). Section 12(a)(2) provides that a person who offers or 
sells a security by means of a prospectus or oral communication that contains an untrue state-
ment or omission of material fact is liable to the purchaser of the security. 
 216. The other possible express-liability analogies are sections 9(e) and 18(a) of the 1934 
Act. Section 9(e) provides an express right of action to a person who purchased or sold a secu-
rity at a price that was affected by a violation of the anti-manipulative provisions of section 
9(a), (b), or (c). Section 9(e) does not include a plaintiff’s-reliance requirement. Section 18(a) 
provides a private right of action to any purchaser or seller of a security against any person who 
made a false statement or omission in a document filed with the SEC. This provision requires 
that the plaintiff have relied on the false statement or omission but does not require that the 
reliance be justifiable or that the plaintiff have exercised due diligence. Sections 9(e) and 18(a) 
are provisions of narrow scope, which are seldom used by litigants. Neither is as closely analo-
gous to Rule 10b-5 as sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act, which, like Rule 10b-5, con-
tain broad prohibitions against misstatements and omissions of material fact. 
 217. Section 11(a) allows a plaintiff to recover his losses from the issuer and certain speci-
fied categories of persons “unless it is proved that at the time [he acquired the securities] he 
knew of [the] untruth or omission.” 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994) (emphasis added). Section 
11(a) imposes a reliance requirement on the plaintiff only in the event that he acquired the 
security at least twelve months after the effective date of the registration statement, under very 
limited circumstances. Section 12(a)(2) allows a purchaser of a security to recover losses from 
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covery only if he actually knew of the untruth or omission at the 
time he acquired the security. 
Congress’s decision not to impose a duty of justifiable reliance or 
due diligence on a plaintiff in sections 11 and 12(a)(2) is consistent 
with the underlying purposes of the securities laws: to protect inves-
tors and to ensure the maintenance of fair and honest markets.218 
Significantly, sections 11 and 12(a)(2), unlike section 10(b) of the 
1934 Act and Rule 10b-5, do not premise the defendant’s liability 
on scienter (i.e., intentional or reckless conduct). These express-
liability sections subject a defendant to liability based on negli-
gence.219 Congress did not allow the contributory negligence of the 
plaintiff to be raised as a defense under these express-liability provi-
sions; there are even stronger policy reasons in favor of allowing even 
a negligent 10b-5 plaintiff to recover, where liability exists only if the 
defendant was guilty of intentional or reckless conduct. Using the 
same method of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court might 
well hold that a plaintiff bringing a suitability claim under Rule 10b-
5 should not be required to prove justifiable reliance on the defen-
dant’s false statements or omissions regarding the suitability of the 
recommended securities, but should be barred from recovery only if 
it actually knew that the securities were unsuitable. 
3. Bateman Eichler: The in pari delicto defense 
Placing a duty on the plaintiff, whether articulated as a require-
ment of justifiable reliance or of due diligence, is an anomaly in the 
federal securities laws, in that it may in fact impose a higher standard 
of conduct on the plaintiff than it does on the defendant. A merely 
negligent plaintiff may be barred from recovering losses from a de-
fendant who acted intentionally or recklessly. This result seems in-
consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding that the considerations 
of equity and investor protection, on which Rule 10b-5 is based, 
may allow recovery by a plaintiff who acts illegally or otherwise 
 
the seller, the only proviso being: “the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission.” 
15 U.S.C. § 77l(a) (1994) (emphasis added). 
 218. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994). 
 219. A defendant in a section 11 case, other than the issuer, has a defense if he exercised 
due diligence. The issuer, however, does not even have a “due diligence” defense under sec-
tion 11(b). A defendant in a section 12(a)(2) case has a defense if he can “sustain the burden 
of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of 
[the] untruth or omission.” Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 77l(2) (1994). 
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wrongfully. In Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner,220 the 
Court held that even a 10b-5 plaintiff who himself was engaged in 
wrongful conduct is not barred from suit by the common law doc-
trine of in pari delicto unless two conditions are met: first, the plain-
tiff’s misconduct must be at least substantially equal to that of the 
defendant and, second, “preclusion of suit would not significantly 
interfere with the effective enforcement of the securities laws and 
protection of the investing public.”221 
Although Bateman Eichler involved the defense of in pari 
delicto,222 and not the requirement that the plaintiff justifiably rely 
on the defendant’s misstatements, the public policy issues involved 
are similar. In fact, the argument for allowing recovery by a plaintiff 
whose only fault was a failure to exercise due diligence is stronger 
than for one who was guilty of wrongful conduct. In Bateman 
Eichler, the Supreme Court emphasized that there is a strong policy 
reason for allowing recovery and pointed out that “implied private 
actions provide ‘a most effective weapon in the enforcement’ of the 
securities laws and are ‘a necessary supplement to Commission ac-
tion.’”223 
The suitability doctrine has a public purpose that goes beyond 
enabling a plaintiff to recover its losses. Broker-dealers act as con-
duits of information between the markets and public investors, and 
the stability and efficiency of the markets depends on brokers making 
honest and well-informed recommendations. Although an institution 
may be at fault for allowing incompetent persons to make investment 
decisions, it is inconsistent with the policy underlying the Bateman 
Eichler decision to bar an institutional plaintiff from suit under Rule 
10b-5 because its agents did not justifiably rely on the defendant’s 
intentional or reckless misstatements or omissions, or did not exer-
cise due diligence in managing their investments. 
 
 220. 472 U.S. 299 (1985). 
 221. Id. at 310–11. 
 222. The name of the defense is an abbreviation of the Latin phrase “in pari delicto po-
tior est conditio defendentis,” which means “‘[i]n a case of equal or mutual fault . . . the posi-
tion of the [defending] party . . . is the better one.’” Id. at 306 (quoting BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979)). 
 223. Id. at 310 (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)). 
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4. The “fraudulent conduct” theory of liability: The problem of 
control of the account by the broker 
The second theory that supports a suitability claim under Rule 
10b-5 is that recommending unsuitable securities is an inherently de-
ceptive practice, and thus fraud by conduct. The few courts that have 
discussed the fraudulent-conduct theory have suggested that the 
plaintiff be required to prove and plead that the broker who recom-
mended the unsuitable securities “controlled” the institutional inves-
tor’s account. The control requirement would greatly increase the 
difficulty that an institutional investor making this kind of claim 
would face. 
As stated above, The Second Circuit’s decision in Clark v. John 
Lamula Investors, Inc.224 was the first time any appellate court held 
that a recommendation of unsuitable securities violated Rule 10b-5. 
Clark was based on the theory that such a recommendation consti-
tuted fraudulent conduct, in violation of subsection (c) of Rule 10b-
5, which prohibits conduct that would operate as a fraud or deceit 
on any person. The fraud arises from an implied representation made 
to the customer by the broker that he will act in the customer’s in-
terest, and that making an unsuitable recommendation violates that 
implied representation.225 This rationale is known as the “shingle 
theory,” a theory developed by the SEC in the early days of federal 
securities regulation226 and upheld by the courts up to the present 
time.227 The shingle theory posits that when a broker-dealer hangs 
out its shingle (i.e., holds itself out as doing business with the pub-
lic), it makes an implied representation to its customers that it will 
deal with them fairly and in accordance with professional standards 
of conduct.228 If the broker-dealer fails to act in this manner, it has 
violated the implied representation that it made, and has, therefore, 
 
 224. 583 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 225. See Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 135 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 
1998) (holding that broker-dealer’s failure to execute an order in a manner consistent with its 
duty of best execution is deceptive because the broker-dealer’s conduct contradicts an implied 
representation to the customer that it will act in such a way as to maximize the customer’s 
economic gain). 
 226. In re Duker & Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386 (1939). 
 227. See, e.g., Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943); Grandon v. 
Merrill Lynch & Co., 147 F.3d 184, 192 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Allen D. Madison, Deriva-
tives Regulation in the Context of the Shingle Theory, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 271. 
 228. See POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW, supra note 1, § 3.01[A], at 3-4 to 3-5. 
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committed a fraud on its customers.229 The deception requirement 
that the Supreme Court established in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. 
Green230 is thus satisfied, even though the defendant did not make a 
misrepresentation or omission of a material fact.231 
In O’Connor v. R.F. Lafferty & Co.,232 the Tenth Circuit sug-
gested that a plaintiff claiming that an unsuitable recommendation 
violated Rule 10b-5 under the “fraudulent conduct” theory of liabil-
ity would face an additional difficulty. It will be recalled that in Clark 
the Second Circuit held that a broker who, acting with scienter, 
makes an unsuitable recommendation to a customer is deemed to 
have engaged in deceptive conduct in violation of Rule 10b-5.233 
The O’Connor court stated that, in addition to these requirements, 
the plaintiff must plead and prove that the broker exercised control 
over the customer’s account.234 In dictum,235 the court reasoned that 
 
 229. It has been held to be a fraud for a broker-dealer to recommend a security if the 
broker does not have a reasonable basis for the recommendation. Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 
596 (2d Cir. 1969). 
 230. 430 U.S. 462, 473–74 (1977). In Santa Fe, the Court stated that section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 were not violated in the absence of “any deception, misrepresentation or nondis-
closure.” Id. at 476 (emphasis added). Thus, it is possible that deceptive conduct can give rise 
to a 10b-5 violation. 
 231. The shingle theory has thus far survived the Supreme Court’s holding in Ernst & 
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), that in order to be liable under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5, a defendant must have acted with scienter, or “intent to deceive, manipulate or 
defraud.” Id. at 188. Given that all of the circuit courts that have considered the question have 
interpreted scienter as encompassing reckless as well as intentional conduct, misconduct by 
broker-dealers such as making unsuitable recommendations is likely to pass the test of scienter. 
See POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW, supra note 1, § 3.01[D][4], at 3-34. Furthermore, scienter 
can be inferred from a broker-dealer’s conduct that violates the broker-dealer’s implied repre-
sentation to its customer that it will maximize the customer’s economic gain. Newton v. 
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266, 273 (3d Cir. 1998). For a view 
that the Supreme Court would probably reject the shingle theory today if a proper case were 
presented to it, see Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1271 (1995). 
 232. 965 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1992). 
 233. See supra notes 171–72 and accompanying text. 
 234. O’Connor, 965 F.2d at 898. The court analogized a suitability claim to a “churn-
ing” (i.e., excessive trading) claim, for which control by the broker is a necessary element. Id. 
The court reasoned that if control were not required, a plaintiff in a churning case could evade 
the control requirement by framing it as an unsuitability case. See also City of San Jose v. 
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc., No. C 84-20601 RFP, 1991 WL 352485 (N.D. Cal. 
June 6, 1991). The same reasoning has been used in suitability cases brought under state secu-
rities laws. See Minneapolis Employees Ret. Fund v. Allison-Williams Co., 519 N.W.2d 176, 
180 (Minn. 1994) (holding that an unsuitability claim under the Minnesota Securities Act re-
quires the three O’Connor elements of unsuitability, scienter, and control). 
 235. See O’Connor, 965 F.2d at 898–99 (dismissing the 10b-5 claim on the ground that 
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the additional element of control “is essential to satisfy the causa-
tion/reliance requirement of a § 10(b), Rule 10b-5 violation.”236 Al-
though the court did not explain this statement, it was apparently 
based on the assumption that if the broker does not control the ac-
count, it may be supposed that the customer exercised her own 
judgment in making the investment decision. Thus, the causal chain 
between the broker’s recommendation and the customer’s loss 
would be broken.237 This view, however, does not take into account 
the possibility that a customer who retains control of her account 
may nevertheless accept her broker’s recommendations because she 
places her trust and confidence in the broker’s superior knowledge 
and expertise in investment matters. In that case, the causal connec-
tion between the unsuitable recommendation and the plaintiff’s loss 
would not be broken. 
To be sure, an institutional investor with an unsuitability claim is 
likely to have difficulty establishing that the broker controlled its ac-
count. Control by a broker is most easily shown where the customer 
has given the broker formal written discretionary authority to decide 
on the securities to be bought and sold in the account. It is relatively 
rare for an institutional investor to give a broker such discretion. 
Many institutions use several brokers to obtain investment advice 
and execute transactions for them, so it is unlikely that any one bro-
ker can be said to control an institutional account. Furthermore, fi-
nancial officers of institutions are in some sense professionals, whose 
responsibility it is to manage the institution’s investments. It seems 
inconsistent with that responsibility for the officer to turn over the 
authority to trade the account to a broker. 
Nevertheless, even where a broker does not have formal trading 
discretion, he may still have de facto control over a customer’s ac-
count. In Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co.,238 a leading case on the 
question of what constitutes control in this context, the Ninth Cir-
cuit took the position that a broker does not control a customer’s 
nondiscretionary account simply because the customer routinely fol-
lows the broker’s recommendations. More is required: 
 
defendant did not act with scienter). 
 236. Id. at 898. 
 237. This view does not take account of the possibility that a customer who retains con-
trol of her account may nevertheless accept her broker’s recommendations because she relies 
on the broker’s superior knowledge and expertise in investment matters. 
 238. 681 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1982). 
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If a broker is formally given discretionary authority to buy and sell 
for the account of his customer, he clearly controls it. Short of that, 
the account may be in the broker’s control if his customer is unable 
to evaluate his recommendations and to exercise an independent 
judgment. . . . 
The touchstone is whether or not the customer has sufficient intel-
ligence and understanding to evaluate the broker’s recommenda-
tions and to reject one when he thinks it unsuitable.239 
Assuming that “sufficient intelligence and understanding to 
evaluate the broker’s recommendation” means the same thing as so-
phistication,240 the control requirement makes it difficult, if not im-
possible, even for an unsophisticated investor to recover under the 
“fraudulent conduct” theory of liability for an unsuitable recom-
mendation under Rule 10b-5.241 If an institutional investor were pre-
sumed to be sophisticated, it would therefore be difficult for the in-
vestor to satisfy the control requirement. 
The foregoing discussion of liability under Rule 10b-5 for un-
suitable recommendations demonstrates that under current 10b-5 
jurisprudence, an institutional investor plaintiff has substantial, if not 
insuperable, obstacles to overcome. If the plaintiff alleges that the 
broker-dealer intentionally or recklessly made a misrepresentation or 
omission of a material fact, under the lower federal courts’ interpre-
tation of Rule 10b-5 the plaintiff must be able to demonstrate that it 
justifiably relied on the misrepresentation or omission or, in some ju-
risdictions, that it exercised due diligence. If, on the other hand, the 
plaintiff alleges that the broker-dealer, by making an unsuitable rec-
ommendation, engaged in deceptive conduct, there is some author-
ity supporting the proposition that the plaintiff must be able to show 
that the broker-dealer controlled its account. The degree of difficulty 
in showing either justifiable reliance or control by the broker will de-
pend to a large extent on whether the institution is considered to be 
a sophisticated investor. 
 
 239. Id. at 676–77. 
 240. Id. Arguably, even an unsophisticated investor could have sufficient intelligence and 
understanding to evaluate a broker’s recommendation. 
 241. See Memphis Hous. Auth. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 
108, 115 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) (finding that question of whether a broker’s failure to advise an 
institutional customer of the risks eliminated the customer’s control over the account was for 
the jury to decide). 
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On the other hand, Supreme Court has suggested (at least by 
implication) that it would not interpret Rule 10b-5 so narrowly in a 
suitability case. The requirement imposed by the majority of the 
lower federal courts that in order to recover, the plaintiff must have 
justifiably relied on the defendant’s misstatements or omissions is in-
consistent with the policy underlying the Court’s holding in Bate-
man Eichler, and with the Court’s technique of “borrowing” from 
express-liability provisions when construing elements of the 10b-5 
implied right of action. Furthermore, the supposed requirement that 
the plaintiff in a “deceptive conduct” suitability case prove that the 
broker exercised control over the account, while not implausible, is 
supported by little more than dictum and does not seem necessary in 
order to establish the causative connection between the defendant’s 
misconduct and the plaintiff’s loss. 
C. Suitability Under the Common Law 
1. Breach of fiduciary duty 
There is a substantial body of law that states that a broker who 
recommends an unsuitable security breaches its fiduciary duty to his 
customer.242 The source of this duty is the common law of agency, 
which holds that an agent, by virtue of his relationship to his princi-
pal, is considered a fiduciary with respect to all matters within the 
scope of his agency.243 A fiduciary is subject to duties that “go be-
yond mere fairness and honesty; they oblige him to act to further the 
beneficiary’s best interests.”244 The Supreme Court of Colorado, for 
example, has held that if a broker makes a recommendation, or 
merely brings a possible investment to the attention of the customer, 
 
 242. An unsuitable recommendation may also be a common law fraud if the broker 
makes an express or implied representation to his customer that the security is suitable for him. 
One of the earliest suitability decisions (involving the sale of an insurance policy, not a security) 
contains a highly interesting discussion of common law fraud in this context. Anderson v. 
Knox, 297 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1961). 
 243. See THE LAW COMMISSION, FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND REGULATORY RULES, 
CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 124, 28 (1992). Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 
795, 800–01 (1983); Langevoort, supra note 20, at 675–80; Eileen Scallen, Promises Broken 
vs. Promises Betrayed: Metaphor, Analogy, and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 897, 908–10. 
 244. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 
DUKE L.J. 879, 882. 
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the broker may be in breach of its fiduciary duty to the customer if 
the broker ignores the unsuitability of the investment, even if the 
customer assents to the transaction.245 
State law is not consistent, however, on the question of whether 
the relationship between a broker and its customer is fiduciary in na-
ture. In general, a fiduciary relationship exists where one person re-
poses trust and confidence in another and where the other person 
encourages or accepts the trust and confidence.246 In New York, the 
broker-customer relationship is considered to be a fiduciary one, 
with the proviso that the broker’s fiduciary obligation is limited to 
the matters entrusted to the broker by the customer.247 The Califor-
nia courts have also held that the customer-broker relationship is fi-
duciary in nature. 248 The Massachusetts courts, on the other hand, 
state that a “simple stockbroker-customer relationship” is considered 
not a fiduciary but rather a business relationship, unless the cus-
tomer, with the broker’s consent, has given the broker discretionary 
authority to trade the account.249 In other jurisdictions, the relation-
ship between a broker and its customer is a fiduciary one only under 
special circumstances, as where the broker exercises discretion in se-
lecting securities for the customer’s account; where the broker, even 
lacking discretionary authority, nevertheless has control over the ac-
count; or where the customer reposes trust and confidence in the 
broker.250 
2. Broker-Dealers’ common law duties 
Regardless of whether or not the broker-customer relationship is 
labeled as fiduciary, a broker may be under a common law duty not 
 
 245. Rupert v. Clayton Brokerage Co., 737 P.2d 1106, 1109 (Colo. 1987). 
 246. See 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 2, at 213 (1987). 
 247. For example, if a customer does not depend on his broker for investment advice but 
does depend on him for execution of transactions, the broker may be considered to be a fidu-
ciary with respect to the latter activity but not the former. See Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. 
Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Conway v. Icahn & Co., 16 F.3d 504, 510 
(2d Cir. 1994) (“The relationship between a stockbroker and its customer is that of principal 
and agent and is fiduciary in nature, according to New York law.”). 
 248. Duffy v. Cavalier, 259 Cal. Rptr. 162, 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
 249. See Brine v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 745 F.2d 100, 103 (1st Cir. 
1984); Carr v. Warner, 137 F. Supp. 611 (D. Mass. 1955). 
 250. For a survey of the cases discussing the circumstances under which the broker-
customer relationship is considered to be a fiduciary one, see POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW, 
supra note 1, §§ 2.01–.02, at 2-3 to 2-47. 
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to recommend unsuitable securities. In Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc.,251 a case that is frequently cited for its detailed 
discussion of a stockbroker’s common law duties, the district court 
strongly suggested the existence of such a duty. The court stated that 
a broker exercising investment discretion on behalf of its customer 
“becomes the fiduciary of his customer in a broad sense” and must 
“manage the account in a manner directly comporting with the 
needs and objectives of the customer as stated in the authorization 
papers or as apparent from the customer’s investment and trading 
history.”252 Even as to a nondiscretionary account, the broker has a 
duty “to recommend a stock only after studying it sufficiently to be-
come informed as to its nature, price and financial prognosis” and 
“to inform the customer of the risks involved in purchasing or selling 
a particular security.”253 The broker’s explanation of these risks will 
depend on the sophistication of the customer: 
For example, where the customer is uneducated or generally unso-
phisticated with regard to financial matters, the broker will have to 
define the potential risks of a particular transaction carefully and 
cautiously. Conversely, where a customer fully understands the dy-
namics of the stock market or is personally familiar with a security, 
the broker’s explanation of such risks may be merely perfunctory.254 
Although the court did not expressly characterize the duties of a 
broker for a nondiscretionary account as fiduciary duties, the duties 
cited in Leib are among those that agency law imposes on an agent, 
as applied in the particular context of the customer-broker relation-
ship. Thus, the Restatement of Agency states that an agent is re-
quired to exercise care and skill in performing his duties and “to give 
his principal information relevant to affairs entrusted to him.”255 An-
other district court has suggested that a broker’s unsuitable recom-
mendation may constitute negligence, since it is a breach of the bro-
ker’s duty to its customer to use due care to ensure that its 
investment advice is competent.256 
 
 251. 461 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Mich. 1978), aff’d, 647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981). 
 252. Leib, 461 F. Supp. at 953. 
 253. Id. (citing Cash v. Frederick & Co., 57 F.R.D. 71 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Hanly v. SEC, 
415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1989)). 
 254. Id. at 953. 
 255. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1958). 
 256. Baker v. Wheat First Sec., 643 F. Supp. 1420, 1430–31 (S.D. W. Va. 1986). 
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The California Court of Appeals has held that a broker’s unsuit-
able recommendation to an institutional customer may be a breach 
of fiduciary duty, even if the account is nondiscretionary and even if 
the customer’s representative tells the broker that he wishes to en-
gage in transactions that would be unsuitable for the institution. In 
Duffy v. Cavalier,257 the trustee of a company’s employee profit-
sharing plan asked a stockbroker if it would trade in options for him 
on behalf of the plan. The court held that the relationship between a 
broker and its customer is fiduciary in nature, and that the broker 
had breached its fiduciary duty to the plan by recommending unsuit-
able securities, even though the institution’s agent had expressed a 
wish to trade in these securities.258 In this regard, the court adopted a 
broad view of the extent of a broker’s duties: 
 [W]here an apparently unsophisticated investor expresses a de-
sire to engage in speculative investments with the objective of mak-
ing large profits, the stockbroker cannot simply carry out the cus-
tomer’s wishes. Rather, the stockbroker has a fiduciary duty (1) to 
ascertain that the investor understands the investment risks in the 
light of his or her actual financial situation; (2) to inform the cus-
tomer that no speculative investments are suitable if the customer 
persists in wanting to engage in such speculative transactions with-
out the stockbroker’s being persuaded that the customer is able to 
bear the financial risks involved; and (3) to refrain completely from 
soliciting the customer’s purchase of any speculative securities 
which the stockbroker considers to be beyond the customer’s risk 
threshold. As long as these duties are met, if the customer never-
theless insists on purchasing speculative securities, the stockbroker 
is not barred from advising the customer about various speculative 
securities and purchasing for the customer those securities which 
the customer selects.259 
. . . 
 A stockbroker’s fiduciary duty requires more than merely carry-
ing out the stated objectives of the customer; at least where there is 
evidence . . . that the stockbroker’s recommendations were invaria-
bly followed, the stockbroker must “determine the customer’s ac-
 
 257. 259 Cal. Rptr. 162 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (citing Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & 
Templeton, Inc., 69 Cal. Rptr. 222 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968)). 
 258. Id.; see also Conway v. Icahn & Co., 16 F.3d 504, 510 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 259. 259 Cal. Rptr. at 169 (citing Twomey, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 222). 
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tual financial situation and needs.” If it would be improper and un-
suitable to carry out the speculative objectives expressed by the cus-
tomer, there is a further obligation on the part of the stockbroker 
“to make this known to [the customer], and [to] refrain from act-
ing except upon [the customer’s] express orders.” Under such cir-
cumstances, although the stockbroker can advise the customer 
about the speculative options available, he or she should not solicit 
the customer’s purchase of any such speculative securities that 
would be beyond the customer’s “risk threshold.”260 
Other courts and arbitrators have agreed that a broker’s unsuit-
able recommendation to an institutional investor constitutes a breach 
of fiduciary duty. In MidAmerica Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. 
Shearson/American Express, Inc.,261 the defendant brokerage firm 
recommended the purchase of GNMA securities to the plaintiff, a 
savings and loan institution, but failed to explain to its representa-
tives some of the crucial terms of these securities. The Tenth Circuit 
affirmed a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, on the ground that 
the recommendation breached the defendant’s fiduciary duty. The 
court found that the defendant was in a position of strength because 
it had held out its agent (the broker) as an expert. The plaintiff, 
which happened to be temporarily without the services of an in-
house financial advisor, relied on the agent’s advice and was thereby 
lulled into a false sense of security.262 
Furthermore, basic principles of agency law suggest that a broker 
is under a duty not to recommend an investment to an entity that is 
not legally permitted to make the investment. Professional standards 
of conduct also require the broker to make some inquiry as to 
whether the investment may legally be made. Institutional managers 
themselves have fiduciary obligations to the owners or beneficiaries 
of the institution (or to the taxpayers, in the case of government en-
tities), and a broker who recommends an investment to an institu-
tion may not aid and abet a manager’s breach of fiduciary duty. As 
one commentator has observed, although courts will not shift liabil-
ity to a broker for executing trades in unsuitable investments made at 
 
 260. Duffy, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 173. 
 261. 886 F.2d 1249 (10th Cir. 1989). 
 262. Id. at 1258; see also In re Westchester Jewish Ctr., 1994-004243, 1994 NYSE Arb. 
Dec. LEXIS 615 (June 28, 1995) (holding brokerage firm liable to synagogue for failing to 
disclose the nature of the CMOs it recommended, and for recommending unsuitable invest-
ments, in light of claimant’s investment objectives). 
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the direction of a trustee for the account of a trust, 
it is reasonable and prudent, however, to require the broker (a) to 
ensure that the fiduciary is capable of understanding and assessing 
in an investment context the information and recommendations 
that the broker provides and (b) to present to the fiduciary only 
those investments that are legally permissible under state law and 
the trust instrument.263 
Imposing such a fiduciary requirement on a broker is consistent 
with the NYSE’s “know your customer” rule, which establishes a 
professional standard for the securities industry, even though the rule 
itself does not specify the documents or information that the broker 
must obtain in performing his due diligence.264 It is reasonable to in-
terpret the “know your customer” rule to require a broker-dealer 
who recommends a security to an institutional investor to ascertain 
any legal restrictions and risk parameters that limit the institution’s 
permissible investments. If the broker has any reason to believe that a 
recommendation would involve the institution in illegal or ultra vires 
conduct, the broker has an obligation to make an inquiry into the 
matter before making the recommendation. 
It may be insufficient for a broker-dealer to rely on what he is 
told by a institutional customer’s financial officer or other represen-
tative. If the broker-dealer has a fiduciary duty, the duty is to the in-
stitution itself, not to the financial officer. This duty would presuma-
bly require the broker-dealer to examine applicable requirements or 
prohibitions of law regarding investments, the institutional cus-
tomer’s enabling instrument, and any written investment policy that 
the institution’s governing board has adopted. Although the “know 
your customer” rule is not itself a legal requirement, it establishes an 
industry standard of conduct, which is highly relevant in a suit based 
on breach of fiduciary or negligence.265 The policy reasons in favor of 
imposing such a requirement on a broker-dealer go beyond recom-
pensing the customer for the losses it has suffered, although that is a 
worthwhile goal; it will promote stable and honest markets by deter-
ring brokers from making unsuitable recommendations to institu-
tional customers. 
 
 263. James S. Shorris, Suitability Obligations of Broker-Dealers for Trust Accounts: Who 
Is the Customer?, 7 SEC. NEWS, No. 1 (1997) at 33. 
 264. N.Y. Stock Exchange, NYSE Rule 405, NYSE GUIDE (CCH) 3696 (2000). 
 265. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 333 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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3. Judicial interpretation of the common law duty 
Despite this background, in recent years several decisions have 
demonstrated indifference, if not downright hostility, to institutional 
investors bringing common law suitability claims. Three recent deci-
sions have rejected such claims on the ground that the relationship 
between broker and customer is not of a fiduciary character. In a 
widely noted case, State v. Morgan Stanley & Co.,266 the State of 
West Virginia sued in state court to recover heavy market losses sus-
tained by its Consolidated Fund (the “Fund”), a state investment 
pool established in order to put idle monies of the State, its agencies, 
and local governments to work.267 The State charged Morgan 
Stanley with aiding and abetting state officials in a breach of fiduciary 
duty, by speculating in the market for U.S. government securities, 
and with constructive fraud. 
Although the Fund had earlier engaged in a limited amount of 
trading in short-term securities, in 1985 it began buying and selling 
securities with maturities of up to thirty years. Such long-term secu-
rities are sensitive to fluctuations in interest rates and carry with them 
substantial market risk.268 Furthermore, the State bought options, 
which greatly magnified the risks. In fact, some of the Fund’s trading 
activities were essentially bets on the future direction of interest 
rates, and these bets were made with the help and encouragement of 
Morgan Stanley. The transactions included the sale to Morgan 
Stanley of a “put” on seven-year Treasury notes and the purchase of 
$1.2 billion in “when issued” seven-year Treasury notes. Morgan 
Stanley also lent money to the State to allow it to pursue its aggres-
sive trading strategy. Morgan Stanley provided “investment informa-
tion to the State and it aggressively pursued the State as a cus-
tomer.”269 “In the spring of 1987, the . . . bond market took an 
unexpected . . . nosedive and [the Fund] . . . sustained enormous 
losses,”270 whereupon the State sued Morgan Stanley. 
On the eve of jury deliberations, the trial court granted summary 
judgment to the State on its claim that Morgan Stanley had know-
 
 266. 459 S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1995). 
 267. Id. at 908. 
 268. Id. at 909 & n.5. 
 269. Morgan Stanley, 459 S.E.2d at 910. For a detailed description of these transactions, 
see Leslie Wayne, Big Risks, Big Losses, Big Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1995, § 3, at 1. 
 270. 459 S.E.2d at 909. 
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ingly aided and abetted State officials in violating the West Virginia 
Code, which provides that persons managing State funds must exer-
cise 
that degree of judgment and care, under circumstances then pre-
vailing, which men of experience, prudence, discretion and intelli-
gence exercise in the management of their own affairs, not for 
speculation but for investment, considering the probable safety of 
their capital as well as the probable income to be derived.271 
The trial court awarded the State $52 million in damages. The 
State’s separate claim that Morgan Stanley had committed construc-
tive fraud was submitted to the jury, which found in favor the State 
and awarded it $4.9 million.272 The West Virginia Supreme Court 
reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the aiding 
and abetting claim, and it also set aside the jury verdict on the con-
structive fraud claim on the ground that the trial judge had given er-
roneous instructions to the jury.273 Although the court’s opinion did 
not expressly refer to the suitability doctrine, it appeared to reject the 
doctrine by implication. The court stated: 
Morgan Stanley was not at any time a fiduciary of the State of West 
Virginia; Morgan Stanley was a co-principal, which bought and 
sold notes and bonds from and to the State . . . , bought and sold 
put and call options from and to the State . . . , and lent money to  
the State . . . (secured by bonds owned by the State) to allow the 
State to pursue its aggressive trading strategy.274 
. . . 
 
 271. Id. at 911 (citing W. VA. CODE § 12-6-12 (1978)). 
 272. The tort of constructive fraud is closely related to a breach of fiduciary duty. The 
California Court of Appeals has defined it as follows: 
Constructive fraud arises on a breach of duty by one in a confidential or fiduciary re-
lationship to another which induces justifiable reliance by the latter to his preju-
dice. . . . Such a confidential relationship may exist whenever a person with justifica-
tion places trust and confidence in the integrity and fidelity of another. 
Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 69 Cal. Rptr. 222, 237 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968). 
 273. Without specifying the portion of the instruction on constructive fraud that was er-
roneous, the Supreme Court stated that the “instruction, combined with the trial court’s in-
struction informing the jury that Morgan Stanley had violated West Virginia law by aiding and 
abetting ‘speculation,’ was tantamount to directing a verdict against Morgan Stanley on the 
constructive fraud claim.” Morgan Stanley, 459 S.E.2d at 913. 
 274. Id. at 910. 
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 Notwithstanding that Morgan Stanley sedulously cultivated 
good customer relations with the State of West Virginia, Morgan 
Stanley was nonetheless a principal in the transactions at stake, not 
a broker, and Morgan had the right to trade with the State without 
undertaking the obligation to insure the State against its elected of-
ficers’ lack of wisdom. “Sophistication”, as that term is used in the 
investment law, should never be confused with intelligence, pru-
dence or good luck.275 
The court went further, opining that the state officials were so-
phisticated investors and, therefore, not deserving of protection from 
the court: 
It is hard to find fraud—constructive or otherwise—when officials 
at the State Treasury were: (a) sophisticated investors; and (b) au-
dited by other State officials, including the State Legislative Audi-
tor. The Board of Investments approved the actions that are at is-
sue . . . ; to say that Morgan Stanley could not reasonably have 
relied on [the State officials’] undisputed and very earnest represen-
tations that deviation [from the guidelines of the State Board of In-
vestments] was permitted by the Board is tantamount to confessing 
that West Virginia officials must at all times be treated as either 
children or incompetents. We are unwilling to accede to this 
proposition . . . [C]ompetent adults who do not need to be led 
around on a leash do, occasionally, buy a piece or two of blue 
sky.276 
The Morgan Stanley court here touched on the most compelling 
policy argument against applying the suitability doctrine to institu-
tional investors: the paternalistic nature of the doctrine.277 Financial 
officials of a State or other government entity are indeed not chil-
dren or incompetents, and they have presumably been appointed be-
cause the governing board or managers of the institution believe 
they have some ability and expertise in investments. It has been ar-
gued that applying the suitability doctrine in this kind of situation 
would encourage public officials to take greater risks and would de-
ter brokers from entering into transactions with public entities.278 
This argument, however, avoids the most important question con-
 
 275. Id. at 913 (footnote omitted). 
 276. Id. at 913 n.17. 
 277. See Markham, supra note 20, at 369 (arguing that the suitability rule is “a very pa-
ternalistic approach to customer protection”). 
 278. Roberts, supra note 20, at 834. 
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cerning the transaction and the relationship between customer and 
broker: Did the state’s officials rely on Morgan Stanley for advice, 
and did the Morgan Stanley brokers accept the role of advisors?279 It 
also begs the question as to whether the taxpayers of a state should 
bear the losses, where aggressive, skillful, highly paid (and, therefore, 
highly motivated) securities salesmen are able to persuade the state’s 
financial agents to buy unsuitable securities? As Professor Langevoort 
has observed: “[I]n many circumstances it is both natural and fore-
seeable for professional investment agents to rely wrongly on the 
representations and recommendations of securities salespeople. 
There is no reason to believe that the principal is somehow at fault 
simply because its agent was tricked.”280 
This is not to say that an incompetent or careless financial officer 
should be exonerated. In many or most cases where an institution 
suffers heavy losses owing to an unsuitable recommendation, the re-
sponsible officials of the institution are punished by losing their jobs 
or even by suffering civil or criminal liability. The question, rather, is 
whether a State’s taxpayers or the brokerage firm should bear the 
losses, where a broker-dealer recommends securities that it knows (or 
should know) to be unsuitable for a public entity. 
4. A broker-dealer acting as principal can be a fiduciary 
Where liability for an unsuitable recommendation rests on a the-
ory of breach of fiduciary duty, the defense is sometimes raised that a 
broker who sells the securities to the customer as a principal and not 
as an agent is not a fiduciary and, therefore, cannot breach a fiduciary 
duty to the customer. In suitability cases involving institutional cus-
tomers, the relationship between broker and customer is said to be 
an ordinary business relationship. Some courts have accepted this 
reasoning, while others have stated that the capacity in which the 
broker acts is just one factor and is not determinative of the nature of 
the relationship. 
Morgan Stanley rests on the premise that there cannot be a fidu-
ciary relationship between a broker and an institutional customer 
 
 279. Professor Gibson states flatly that “the relationship between derivatives dealers and 
end-users is not an advisory relationship.” Gibson, supra note 20, at 571. The cases that I have 
discussed in this article should indicate that Professor Gibson’s unqualified assertion is unjusti-
fied. 
 280. Langevoort, supra note 20, at 696. 
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where the broker acts as a principal, selling a security to its client, 
rather than as an agent, buying the securities for its client. Under this 
view, the broker was, therefore, dealing at arm’s length with its cus-
tomer and was under no obligation to inform the customer that the 
securities were unsuitable for it. Other recent decisions have agreed 
with the dubious proposition that parties who trade with each other 
as principal cannot have a fiduciary relationship. In Banca Cremi, 
S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc.,281 the Fourth Circuit affirmed the 
dismissal of a foreign bank’s claim that a brokerage firm’s recom-
mendation of CMOs violated the broker’s fiduciary duty. In finding 
that the relationship was not fiduciary, and that the plaintiff, there-
fore, could not have a suitability claim based on the breach of a fidu-
ciary duty, the court reasoned as follows: 
Epley [the brokerage firm’s salesman] and Alex. Brown were not 
the agents of the Bank, but rather interacted with the Bank at arm’s 
length in principal-to-principal dealings, and no common law fidu-
ciary duty was ever created. 
. . . 
 [T]he defendants did not act as agents for the Bank, but rather 
conducted their business at arm’s length in a principal-to-principal 
relationship. There was accordingly no formal relationship giving 
rise to a fiduciary duty, and the record reveals no informal relation-
ship which could allow the imposition of such a duty.282 
The assertion that no fiduciary duty can arise where a broker sells 
securities to a customer as principal, rather than as agent, was also 
made in Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co.283 A very large 
publicly held company sued a comparably large broker-dealer for de-
claratory relief and damages with respect to losses suffered from two 
interest rate swaps that the company had executed with the broker-
dealer.284 Although Procter & Gamble (“P&G”) did not allege un-
 
 281. 132 F.3d 1017 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 282. Id. at 1030, 1038. 
 283. 925 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio 1996). 
 284. “A swap is an agreement between two parties . . . to exchange cash flows over a pe-
riod of time. Generally, the purpose of an interest rate swap is to protect a party from interest 
rate fluctuations.” For example, one party will agree to pay a fixed rate of interest, while the 
other party “assumes a floating interest rate based on the amount of the principal of the under-
lying debt. . . . [T]his amount does not change hands; only the interest payments are ex-
changed.” Id. at 1275. 
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suitability as a separate claim, it appeared to be at least one of the 
bases for the suit.285 The district court held that the swaps were not 
securities and, therefore, were not covered by the federal securities 
laws and, further, that they were exempt from regulation under the 
Commodity Exchange Act.286 As to P&G’s claim of breach of fiduci-
ary duty, the court applied New York law: 
New York law is clear that a fiduciary relationship exists from the 
assumption of control and responsibility and is founded upon trust 
reposed by one party in the integrity and fidelity of another. No fi-
duciary relationship exists . . . [where] the two parties were acting 
and contracting at arm’s length. Moreover, courts have rejected the 
proposition that a fiduciary relationship can arise between parties to 
a business relationship.287 
The court concluded that the relationship between the parties 
was not of a fiduciary nature: “P&G and BT were in a business rela-
tionship. They were counterparties. Even though . . . BT had supe-
rior knowledge in the swaps transactions, that does not convert their 
business relationship into one in which fiduciary duties are im-
posed.”288 
In these three decisions—Morgan Stanley, Banca Cremi, and 
Proctor & Gamble—the courts regarded the relationship between 
the broker and its institutional customer as a “business relationship” 
rather than a fiduciary relationship, because the broker-dealer dealt 
 
 285. The complaint alleged fraud, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent 
misrepresentation, negligence, and violations of the federal securities and commodity statutes, 
the Ohio blue sky laws, and the Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Id. at 1274. 
 286. Id. at 1283–85. 
 287. Id. at 1289 (quoting Beneficial Commerce Corp. v. Murray Glick Datsun, Inc., 601 
F. Supp. 770, 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)). 
 288. Id. at 1289. The court nevertheless held that, even in the absence of a fiduciary 
duty, under New York law a party may be under an implied contractual duty to make disclo-
sures to the other party. “Such a duty may arise where (1) a party has superior knowledge of 
certain information; (2) that information is not readily available to the other party; and (3) the 
first party knows that the second party is acting on the basis of mistaken knowledge.” Id. at 
1290. Thus, Bankers Trust had a duty to disclose material information to P & G both before 
the parties entered into the swap transactions and in their performance, and also a duty to deal 
fairly and in good faith during the performance of the swap transactions. Since the claim was 
one of fraud (i.e., failure to disclose material information), the plaintiff had to prove its case by 
clear and convincing evidence, not mere preponderance of the evidence. Furthermore, the 
plaintiff had no claim for negligent misrepresentation in the absence of a “special relationship” 
between the parties. Since the parties were both sophisticated corporations whose dealings 
were on a business level, there was no special relationship between them. Id. at 1289–91. 
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with its institutional customer as a principal, not as an agent.289 
These courts do not explain what they mean by the term “business 
relationship” or why one party to a business relationship cannot also 
owe fiduciary duties to the other party. 
Courts have repeatedly held, however, that a broker-dealer can 
have a fiduciary relationship with an institutional customer, if the 
customer reposes trust and confidence in the broker-dealer, and if 
the transaction that is the subject of the dispute is relevant to the 
matters entrusted to the broker.290 It is true that the existence of a 
fiduciary relationship (as opposed to an ordinary business relation-
ship) is derived from agency law, and that a broker-dealer who sells a 
security to a customer as principal is not acting as in the capacity of 
an agent. 291 Nevertheless, the federal courts have long held that the 
capacity in which a broker-dealer acts is not determinative of whether 
or not a fiduciary relationship exists. In the recent case of Lehman 
Brothers Commercial Corp. v. Minmetals International Non-Ferrous 
Metals Trading Co.,292 the district court rejected the broker-dealer’s 
argument that a broker-dealer who acted as principal in transactions 
with its institutional customer could not, as a matter of law, have a 
fiduciary relationship with the customer. The court stated: 
At base, the existence of a fiduciary relationship is a factual ques-
tion. It “cannot be determined ‘by recourse to rigid formulas;’ 
rather, ‘New York courts typically focus on whether one person has  
 
 
 289. See, e.g., Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1030 
(4th Cir. 1997); Procter & Gamble, 925 F. Supp. at 1289–90; State v. Morgan Stanley, 459 
S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1995). 
 290. See Press v. Chem. Inv. Serv. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1999); Union 
Bank of Switzerland v. HS Equities, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Weinfeld, J.) 
(finding that broker owed a fiduciary duty to large Swiss bank to keep the bank fully informed 
as to material matters that could affect the bank’s judgment with respect to transactions which 
were the subject of its account); Memphis Hous. Auth. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 
Inc., 639 F. Supp. 108 (W.D. Tenn. 1986). 
 291. Professor Gibson states: 
As a principal to the transaction, the derivatives dealer assumes the risks associated 
with the trade, just as the end-user assumes the attendant risks. Further, in deriva-
tives transactions, the dealer and end-user are both referred to as counter-parties, a 
title which suggests that both parties are at counter-positions, transacting business at 
arm’s length. 
Gibson, supra note 20, at 572. However, neither the fact that the dealer may assume certain 
risks nor the title by which the parties are known negates the possibility that there is a fiduciary 
relationship between the parties. 
 292. No. 94 Civ. 8301 JFK, 2000 WL 1702039 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2000). 
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reposed trust or confidence in another who thereby gains a result-
ing superiority or influence over the first.” 
 Courts in this District have found that a fiduciary relationship 
could potentially arise in a “principal-to-principal” arm’s-length re-
lationship based upon the degree of trust that exists in that rela-
tionship.293 
Although broker-dealers usually act in the capacity of agent when 
they execute transactions for customers in listed securities on stock 
exchanges, they frequently act as principals in transactions in the 
over-the-counter market.294 The over-the-counter market is consid-
ered a dealer market, in which broker-dealer firms frequently sell se-
curities to customers out of their own inventory.295 Even when a 
broker-dealer does not have an inventory in a security that it is sell-
ing to a customer, it nevertheless may choose to act as a principal, 
rather than as agent, by buying the security from another broker-
dealer acting as a market maker in the security and then reselling it 
to the customer as principal.296 An “integrated” firm, which acts 
both as a wholesale market maker and as a retail broker in a particu-
lar security, will normally deal as principal with both its individual 
and institutional customers. Furthermore, a broker-dealer that sells 
 
 293. Id. at *26–*27 (quoting Scott v. Dime Sav. Bank, 886 F. Supp. 1073, 1078 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 101 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
 294. As two experts explained: 
Over-the-counter trades are most commonly transacted on a net price basis. (That, 
again, is because your “broker” acts as a dealer or principal, not an agent.) You do 
not pay a commission; instead the securities dealer builds a profit margin or markup 
into the price you’re asked to pay. Similarly, when you sell, the dealer buys from you 
at a price that subtracts a markdown from the market’s current wholesale or inside 
price. 
LOUIS ENGEL & HENRY HECHT, HOW TO BUY STOCKS 130 (8th ed. 1994). 
A study done by the SEC in the 1960s showed that 62.5 percent of all over-the-counter 
purchases by institutional customers and 35.8 percent of all purchases by individual customers 
were principal transactions. SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 140, pt. II, at 612. The over-the-
counter market is any market in which securities transactions are conducted through a tele-
phone and computer network, rather than on the floor of a stock exchange. DOWNES & 
GOODMAN, supra note 32, at 427. 
 295. Norman S. Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC’s 
National Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 883, 894 (1981). 
 296. Id. This type of transaction is called a “riskless transaction,” because the broker does 
not take on the risks of ownership of the security, even though he deals as a principal, not as an 
agent, with the customer. SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 140, pt. II, at 611; see also JOHN 
DALTON, HOW THE STOCK MARKET WORKS 87, 175 (1988). 
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to a customer an OTC derivative instrument that it has itself created 
is most likely to do so in a principal transaction, since it automatically 
owns the security that it has created. In over-the-counter transac-
tions, the broker-dealer may choose to execute transactions with its 
customer in a principal capacity, regardless of whether the customer 
has reposed trust or confidence in the broker-dealer and whether the 
broker-dealer has accepted or encouraged such trust or confidence. 
Given the fact that a broker-dealer is usually able to decide uni-
laterally whether it will deal with its customers as agent or as princi-
pal, it would be anomalous if the broker were allowed to avoid fidu-
ciary obligations simply by choosing to act as principal. This has been 
the view of the courts. For example, in a recent case, the Third Cir-
cuit held that a broker-dealer has a duty to execute customers’ trans-
actions at the best available price, whether it is acting as principal or 
agent.297 And one district court has stated: 
[T]he choice of function . . . cannot be (and was never intended to 
be) a means by which a broker may elect whether or not the law 
will impose fiduciary standards upon him in the actual circum-
stances of any given relationship or transaction. . . . What is decisive 
in the end is that the facts of the case disclose an “agency” relation-
ship in the most basic and unmistakable sense of both the common 
law and securities law.298 
The duties that a broker owes its customer should not depend on 
the broker-dealer’s choice of capacity, but rather on the usual factors 
that determine whether a fiduciary relationship exists, particularly the 
trust and confidence placed in the broker by the customer, the de-
pendence of the customer on the broker’s skill and knowledge, the 
equality or inequality of access to information, and the complexity of 
the security being sold.299 
 
 297. Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266, 270 n.1 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. 
Kravitz, 525 U.S. 811 (1998). 
 298. Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); see also 
Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (holding that broker-dealer that is also an 
investment advisor with respect to transactions in which it acts as principal cannot deny its fi-
duciary status). 
 299. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1226–
1228 (1995); DeMott, supra note 244, at 882. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
An institutional investor that institutes a lawsuit or an arbitration 
against a brokerage firm to recover losses suffered as a result of an 
unsuitable recommendation must overcome great difficulties under 
existing legal decisions. These difficulties stem from the largely unex-
amined premise that every institution is a sophisticated investor and 
able to fend for itself, even against a skillful securities salesperson 
who misrepresents or fails to disclose the risk of a security. As a re-
sult, there are few cases where an institutional investor has been suc-
cessful in asserting a suitability claim. An action based on common 
law breach of fiduciary duty is likely to fail on the ground that no fi-
duciary relationship exists between the broker and the institution. A 
suitability claim based on securities fraud is likely to fail on one of 
two grounds: either that the institution did not justifiably rely on the 
broker’s misrepresentations or omissions (or, in some circuits, did 
not exercise due diligence), or that the broker, even if it engaged in 
deceptive conduct, is not liable because it did not control the institu-
tion’s account. 
The assumption that the financial officers of institutional inves-
tors are always sophisticated is a mistaken one. The officers of many 
institutions lack sophistication, at least when it comes to complex de-
rivative securities. Skillful and unscrupulous salespeople can manipu-
late even sophisticated financial officers. Furthermore, even where an 
institution’s financial officer makes investments despite awareness 
that the securities recommended to him by a broker-dealer are un-
suitable for the institution, the broker-dealer has an obligation to its 
institutional customer under professional securities industry stan-
dards not to recommend unsuitable securities. A broker-dealer is also 
obliged to take affirmative steps to learn the legal limitations on the 
institution’s permissible investments and its investment objectives, as 
reflected in its formal investment policies. 
Under traditional principles of securities law, a broker who inten-
tionally or recklessly makes an unsuitable recommendation to an in-
stitutional investor should be liable to the institution for any losses 
that the institution incurs if the institution can show that the rec-
ommendation was a contributory cause of its losses. A broker who 
recommends a security without taking reasonable steps to learn the 
investment objectives and risk tolerance (as established by its govern-
ing board within the framework of applicable law) of his institutional 
customer can be deemed to be acting recklessly. Such due diligence 
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would include a discussion of the institution’s investment objectives 
and risk tolerance with the institution’s investment officer. It would 
normally also include a review of any written investment policy of the 
institution, the institution’s governing instrument, and any applica-
ble legal restrictions on investments. Imposing these duties would 
not shift to the broker the responsibility for institutional investments 
that go wrong or make the broker a guarantor of the success of the 
institution’s investments.300 It would simply make a broker-dealer, as 
a trained professional in the securities industry, responsible for mak-
ing affirmative recommendations that it knows or ought to know are 
unsuitable for its institutional customers. 
Placing the responsibility on the broker for the suitability of its 
recommendations would promote efficiency, fairness, and the hon-
esty of the markets. The rule would be efficient because the broker-
dealer is usually in a better position than the customer to learn the 
essential facts and degree of risk concerning a security that it is rec-
ommending, and can do so at a lower cost. In the case of over-the-
counter derivative instruments, the broker-dealer may well have cre-
ated the security that it is selling to the institution and, thus, is sure 
to be more familiar with it than is the customer. An institutional in-
vestor is unlikely to have access to all of the information relating to a 
security that a broker-dealer possesses. Although the institution is 
likely to be more familiar with its own risk preference than the bro-
ker would be, under well established securities industry standards, 
every brokerage firm has an obligation to take reasonable steps to 
know its customer. Nevertheless, it is extremely unlikely that a bro-
ker would be held liable for recommending a security which, after 
making a reasonable inquiry, it reasonably believed was suitable for 
its institutional customer. 
A rule that imposes liability on the broker-dealer for unsuitable 
 
 300. This author is aware of, but disagrees with, the statement in a recent report of the 
New York City Bar Association that in the absence of a rule presuming institutional investors 
to be sophisticated, dealers would become guarantors of their institutional customers’ invest-
ments. Bar of N.Y., supra note 83, at 96. Perhaps, as the report states, “it is easy (and tempt-
ing) to view any losing investment as, in hindsight, unsuitable.” Id. Unsuitability, like any 
other legal concept, will sometimes be difficult to define and apply; however, as I argue in this 
article, that is not sufficient reason to create a presumption that institutional investors are so-
phisticated, and then to bar their claims on that basis. Further, most of the decisions rejecting 
liability do not do so on the ground that the recommendation was suitable for the institutional 
investor, but rather that the institution should bear the responsibility for its investment deci-
sions. 
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recommendations to an institution would be a fair rule under most 
circumstances. A broker-dealer who intentionally or recklessly rec-
ommends unsuitable securities to a customer is more at fault than an 
institution’s financial officer who fails to exercise sufficient diligence 
in managing the institution’s investments, or than an institution that 
failed to hire a sufficiently sophisticated investment officer.301 
A rule imposing liability on broker-dealers who recommend un-
suitable securities to institutional investors also is consistent with 
public policy, principally because it would deter brokers from inten-
tionally or recklessly recommending unsuitable securities. Although 
encouraging investors to exercise diligence also is an important pub-
lic policy, in the area of institutional investment it is hardly necessary 
to limit brokers’ liability in order to achieve that goal: institutional 
investors’ financial officers are sufficiently deterred from negligent 
conduct and over-reliance on brokers’ representations by the likely 
prospect of being demoted or losing their jobs, or even being crimi-
nally prosecuted, regardless of whether the institution is eventually 
able to recover its losses in a lawsuit or arbitration. Until the com-
mission system of compensation that is used in the securities indus-
try, a system which is the engine that drives high-pressure and dis-
honest selling, is reformed, the most effective way to deter broker-
dealers and their employees from making unsuitable recommenda-
tions to institutional investors is the credible threat of a private law-
suit or arbitration. 
 
 301. See supra text accompanying notes 222–23 (discussing Bateman Eichler, Hill Rich-
ards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985)). 
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